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EXPERIENCE AND SIGNALING VALUE IN TECHNOLOGY






When commercializing technology, the lack of proven results and a reluctance to invest
upfront in resources hamper efforts by firms to work jointly with inventors to bring new
discoveries to market. An effective contract payment structure—a mix of upfront and
royalty payments—can help overcome these hurdles. We conduct our research in uni-
versity technology licensing, where licensing managers act as intermediaries to unite
inventors and licensee firms. Rather than leveraging their experience to bargain for
maximum payments, highly experienced managers offer contractual payment struc-
tures that trade lower upfront payments for higher royalty payments in order to signal
value. The signal instills confidence in the value of the partnership for skeptical licensee
firms, and experienced licensing managers can amplify signals as needed to overcome
the uncertainties inherent in technology commercialization. By explicitly addressing
these variations in signal strength, we develop new theory that builds on classical sig-
naling principles. We test and confirm these predictions in a sample of over 950
invention-licensing contracts. In addition to advancing signaling theory, our work has
implications for academic entrepreneurship, and for how experience shapes value-
sharing agreements in collaborative innovations.
“Be careful not to compromise what you want most
for what you want now”
Zig Ziglar
In the market for innovative technologies, the
successful commercialization of new discoveries
often depends on bringing multiple parties together.
Inventorsmaypush the frontiers of science, but often
lack the skills and resources needed to bring their
breakthroughs to market. And while firms desire
cutting-edge products to stay competitive, they
prefer not to take on the risky efforts of basic scien-
tific research that require significant investment, but
yield few discoveries (Teece, 1986). Given these
complementary interests, opportunities to collabo-
rate should appeal to both sides. However, poten-
tially fruitful collaborations are often stymied by
a buyer’s reluctance to commit to still-unproven
products and technologies (Dushnitsky, 2010). With
limited verifiable information regarding the market
potential of a nascent innovation, buyers (licensees)
wish to invest as little as possible, especially upfront,
whereas sellers (inventors) seek as much as possible
upfront to minimize the risks associated with de-
veloping their technologies (Gans & Stern, 2003). To
break through this impasse, buyers and sellers of
technology depend on intermediaries to craft an ef-
fective contract payment structure—amix of upfront
and performance payments—as compensation for
the risks associated with commercializing a new
technology, and motivation for the rewards that fol-
low a successful effort (Shane, 2001). Designing
a contract payment structure that satisfies all parties
is extremely difficult in practice, so intermediaries
rely on experience to construct the best agreements.
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Experienced intermediaries can construct the
payment structure in one of two ways. A conven-
tional bargaining approach suggests that experience
will lead intermediaries to use their skills to their
own advantage (seeking higher upfront payments
and royalty payments). In this approach, experi-
enced intermediaries will use the contract payment
structure to resolve clashing interests with a
“winner-take-all” objective of seeking greater
yields for the inventors. Alternatively, experienced
intermediaries, who aremore certain about the value
they create, could also propose a tradeoff involving
a lower upfront but higher royalty payment. Experi-
enced intermediaries are able to offer this latter
contract payment approach because of their ability
to select more promising opportunities and match
them to capable partners. When designed by skilled
intermediaries, contracts that signal value and min-
imize risk can effectively create more shared value.
Signaling the value of an unproven innovation is
a key element in promoting collaborations between
skeptical parties; as such, we use signaling theory to
understand how contract payment structures oper-
ate in technology licensing. When employed effec-
tively, signals can address the obstacles that prevent
agreement between parties when quality cannot be
directly observed (Stiglitz, 2000). There is a long
tradition of studying how andwhy signals operate in
wide-ranging contexts from labor markets (Spence,
1974) to financial performance (John & Williams,
1985) to evaluating investment opportunities
(Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2015). Within this
body of research, our comprehensive review
revealed two areas in signaling theory that require
further investigation. First, theoretical models pre-
dict a better-informed party signals potential value
by changing the contract structure toprioritize future
risky payments over fixed upfront payments (Beggs,
1992; Gallini & Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler, Pe´rez-
Castrillo, & Veugelers, 2008). Although theoretical
models assume that the sender possesses superior
information, in practice senders do not always pos-
sess this ability to hold superior information (Hegde,
2014); we lack studies investigating the source of
information. Second, signals are beneficial when
information on quality cannot be easily verified.
However, research on signals has not always in-
vestigated this need to signal when receivers are
poorly informed about a technology’s true value
(Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013; Ramchander,
Schwebach, & Staking, 2012). This could be the
reason why signaling research about payment
structures contains mixed findings (Hegde, 2014;
Lafontaine, 1993; Macho-Stadler et al., 2008; Shane,
Shankar, & Aravindakshan, 2006). By considering
intermediary experience, we can address these two
shortcomings in signaling theory—integrating sig-
naling ability and need into a unified framework—to
better understand how parties agree on contract
payment structures. This is vital because signals
are costly: signaling can be counterproductive for
senders who signal inappropriately or when the
need is not as great.
By knowing how to select promising inventions
and match them effectively to capable licensees,
experienced intermediaries can create and signal
greater commercial value to skeptical buyers
through contract payment structures that offer lower
upfront payments and higher royalty rates. With
experience, signalers learn how to alter the contract
structure to convey potential and encourage hesi-
tant parties to collaborate (Holcomb, Holmes, &
Connelly, 2009; Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007).
Lower upfront payments reduce concern over un-
certain results anddemonstrate confidence about the
opportunity’s value. At the same time, higher royalty
payments shift the risk toward the intermediary
(since payments are delayed) and signal thepotential
value to the buyer (since payments depend on future
performance). In this way, the added value benefits
all parties and does not simply reward intermediar-
ies (and the sellers they represent) unilaterally for
their own advantage.
We conducted our study within the context of
a technology transfer office (TTO) at a large public
U.S. university. In this setting, the TTO’s licensing
managers seek opportunities to license and com-
mercialize technology produced at the university
through outside firms. We analyze how experienced
licensing managers employ their signaling ability
(frombetter knowledge of an invention’s value) amid
varying levels of signaling need (resulting from
technological uncertainty)—two conditions not ex-
plicitly accounted for in prior research. Based on
our analysis of over 950 invention-licensing con-
tract pairs, we present evidence for how experi-
ence (ability) influences contract payment structure
combinations (upfront fixed-fees and royalty rates)
and for how three contingencies (need to signal)—
science-intensive inventions, inventor experience,
and patent scope—affect this main relationship.
Our study offers several contributions. By making
use of signaling theory, our work demonstrates
how intermediaries signal value credibly and effec-
tively through contract payment structures (the
tradeoff between upfront and royalty payments). We
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pinpoint how experience influences contract
choices resulting from selecting promising technol-
ogies and matching them with capable commercial-
ization partners (expanding on baseline ideas from
Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Ndofor &
Levitas, 2004). By examining contingencies to the
relationship between intermediary experience and
contract payment structures, we illustrate how sig-
nals can be adjusted depending on the sender’s
ability or the need for a stronger signal. These in-
sights have practical implications for commercial-
izing new ideas (building on principles articulated
by Gre´goire & Shepherd, 2012; Shane, 2000) and
aligning incentives to motivate each party to expend
the necessary effort to bring opportunities to fruition
(complementing the foundational concepts from
Bazerman & Neale, 1985 and March & Olsen, 1989).
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND CONTRACT
PAYMENT STRUCTURES
The technology-licensing context is an appropri-
ate setting to study how contract payment structures
are crafted. The commercialization of academic sci-
ence is a high-risk activity, so determining the pay-
ment structures for licensing technology can be
complex. Often, significant upfront investments are
needed just to bring initial discoveries to a proof-of-
concept stage, and muchmore additional funding to
actually bring a product to market. Given the high
costs andprobability of failure, thebuyers (licensees)
wish to minimize their upfront investment, whereas
inventors seek upfront payments to maximize their
own return. Almost all university licensing agree-
ments contain some combination of an upfront
fixed-fee payment and a royalty rate to balance these
concerns (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). These two com-
ponents form the core of the contract payment
structure.
Technology Transfer Office Study Context
We examined the determinants of the contract
payment structure by studying a TTO that is one of
the oldest and largest of its kind in the U.S., with an
endowment of over $2 billion. As the licensing arm
of a largeU.S. university, the TTOgenerates over $50
million annually from its portfolio of inventions.We
visited the TTO regularly to conduct interviews
with its senior management, intellectual property
managers, licensing managers, and legal counsel to
develop a deeper understanding of the TTO’s li-
censing processes. These interviews allowed us to
understand how decisions were made regarding the
contract payment structures of the TTO’s licensing
agreements.
Our setting involves three parties: the inventor
(seller), the licensee firm (buyer), and the TTO li-
censing manager (intermediary). The TTO and its
licensingmanagers serve as intermediaries1 between
inventors—who tout the possibilities, usefulness,
and potential of their discoveries—and the licensee
firms—who are more skeptical in their assessment
of a new technology’s profitability (Wennberg,
Wiklund, & Wright, 2011; Wright, Clarysse, Lockett,
& Knockaert, 2008). The inventor’s and the TTO’s
(represented by the licensingmanagers) incentives are
closely aligned, as they share the licensing income in
a fixed proportion. As such, both will seek to earn
a higher licensing income. The licensee, on the other
hand, seeks topay as little to the inventor and theTTO,
and as far along in the technology development pro-
cess, as possible.
Among the different positions in the TTO, our
study focuses specifically on the licensing manager
role, since they play an important part in designing
the contract payment structure for licensing agree-
ments. Licensing managers help secure the TTO’s
annual revenue, which comes from the successful
commercialization of innovations conceived in the
university setting. As a matter of university policy,
all employees are obligated to disclose their in-
ventions to the TTO, even if they want to commer-
cialize their inventions themselves. At monthly
meetings, these inventions are discussed for their
licensing potential and their likelihood of receiving
patent protection. If the inventions are favorable on
both dimensions, the TTO will file for a patent and
pay for attorney and initial filing fees. The invention
is then assigned to a licensing manager, who works
with the inventors to find a suitable firm to license
the technology.
Contract Payment Structure: Upfront Fixed-Fee
Payments and Royalty Rate
One of the defining features of technology licens-
ing is the way in which the contract payment struc-
ture is designed between the buyers and sellers. Not
1 Inour study, intermediariesmaychoose to send signals
through their contract designs and licensing managers
serve as the principal intermediaries. For ease of exposi-
tion, we use “intermediary” and “signal sender” when
making general arguments and “licensing manager”when
making specific arguments related to our context.
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only do both parties have opposite preferences for
the total size of the payment, but they also have
conflicting preferences for how that payment should
be structured. The buyers of inventions (licensees)
would prefer to pay as little upfront as possible to
minimize their risk and the uncertain outcomes
they face. Their goal is to delay payments and make
them contingent upon the invention’s performance
through a royalty rate (Gallini & Wright, 1990;
Macho-Stadler et al., 2008). Conversely, economic
theory predicts that for multiple reasons—such as
risk aversion and financial constraints—the sup-
pliers of inventions (the inventors in our context)
will prefer high upfront fixed-fee payments for an
invention (Crama, De Reyck, & Degraeve, 2008;
Kulatilaka & Lin, 2006). Licensing managers negoti-
ate fixed fees for the reimbursement of patent filing
fees and other upfront costs required for commer-
cialization. These are substantial investments—
initial filing fees can range from $30,000 to several
hundred thousand dollars for a broad, defensible
patent claim in the U.S. and international markets.
As such, any decision to trade off certain short-term
payments for uncertain royalties is a costly one.
Experience and Contract Payment Structure Design
At this point, it is helpful to consider how experi-
ence influences the design of the contract payment
structure in technology licensing. We begin with the
basic assumption that, with experience, licensing
managers have a better ability to craft agreements
that bring buyers and sellers together to commer-
cialize the technology. One pathway to agreement is
through bargaining and using the power that comes
from greater knowledge to claim a larger share of the
value created. We know from research that bargain-
ing power gets stronger with experience (Neale &
Bazerman, 1985). As experienced licensing man-
agers learn about opportunities through their in-
dustry contacts and professional networks, they are
better positioned to leverage this knowledge to bar-
gain for more favorable contract terms. This per-
spective assumes that through effective bargaining,
the clashing interests between buyers and sellers are
settled in the contract payment structure. Since the
focus of this strategy is about gaining an advantage,
this approach will likely lead to one party (the TTO)
benefitting at the expense of the other (the licensee) if
the contract is accepted with simultaneously higher
upfront fees and royalty rates.
Experienced licensing managers can follow an-
other pathway to design a contract payment structure
that unites all parties toward a common outcome.
This alternative strategy requires licensing managers
to determine whether commercial value can be cre-
ated, as a result of selecting a specific invention to
be licensed to a particular firm. Experience allows
licensing managers to make this determination
(through selection and matching) with greater cer-
tainty. To entice firms to enter into a licensing agree-
ment, experienced licensing managers design a
contract payment structure that lowers the upfront
fixed-fee payment in favor of a performance-based
royalty. They use this as a signal to convey potential
quality to prospective licensees. In the following
section, we describe the conceptual framework for
how signals operate and why they can be an effective
means for addressing information asymmetry be-
tween buyers and sellers of technology.
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND SIGNALING
Information asymmetry is a fundamental and
persistent concern affecting the commercialization
of new inventions (Gallini & Wright, 1990; Macho-
Stadler et al., 2008). On the supply side, highly sci-
entific discoveries are difficult to evaluate because
their quality and success depend on multiple di-
mensions, which may not be fully apparent in na-
scent products or services. On the demand side,
there are uncertainties as to whether partners can
successfully bring an innovation to market. Success
depends on the partners’ ability to absorb the aca-
demic science, the extent of their market reach, and
the breadth and depth of their product portfolio
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994). Therefore, standard
economic theory predicts that without any in-
tervention, the information asymmetry between the
risk-averse inventor and licensee will prevent mu-
tually beneficial collaborations. Scholars have
studied different mechanisms to overcome this fric-
tion. One such intervention is the use of signals.
When properly deployed, a signal serves to
bridge the gap caused by information asymmetry
between the multiple parties who seek to enter into
a collaborative agreement (Audretsch, Bo¨nte, &
Mahagaonkar, 2012; Spence, 1973). Signals and sig-
naling have the following characteristics: (1) Sig-
naling occurs when the better-informed party
(sender) moves first and provides an indication of
the underlying quality to the uninformed party (re-
ceiver); (2) The signal is credible if the investment
that is made by the sender is costly and irreversible;
(3) The signal is informative if the magnitude of the
cost to signal is dependent on the underlying quality
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of the sender (Spence, 1973: 358). The uninformed
party (the recipient) receives the signal and enters
into a contract that fits their assessment of the
sender’s underlying quality. Although all credible
and informative signals are costly, some senders are
able to produce signals at a lower relative costs than
others. According to signaling theory, senders repre-
senting a higher quality have a lower cost of investing
in a signal than those who have a lower quality.2
Therefore, senders representing higher quality are
more likely to make the investment to emit a signal.
Conversely, for senders representing lower quality,
thecostof investing ina signal ishigher thanits return,
making a signal an unattractive investment.
We argue that our setting is ideal for confirming
and informing the predictions of signaling theory,
because it combines four desirable aspects of signals
and their senders: a signal sender with varying abil-
ity, situations with different need to signal, in which
the signal, changes in price, are sentwith intentional
purpose to specific receivers. We refer to Appendix
A for a summary of applications of signaling theory.3
This survey also reveals that despite pricing being
much studied in theoretical economic models as
a signaling tool, it has received relatively little at-
tention in the management literature. In the studies
that combine these characteristics of signals and
senders, the findings are mixed (e.g., Etzion & Pe’er,
2014; Kirmani & Rao, 2000).
Signal Sender Characteristics
Much of the literature assumes that senders have
a constant ability to signal, and that the baseline need
to signal does not vary. For example, the earliest
signaling literature studying the role of education in
the labor market (Spence, 1973) assumes that edu-
cation is undertaken once and that the ability of
the signal sender—the potential employee—is in-
variant. This reduces the adaptability of the signal to
suit the evolving abilities or needs of the signal
sender, which erodes the value of the signal over
time (Merluzzi & Phillips, 2016; Sauer, Thomas-
Hunt, & Morris, 2010). Our setting, in which the
licensing manager’s experience varies with time,
allows us to explore whether and how experience of
the licensing manager or the inventor affects signal-
ing ability and the signals being sent.
The literature on signaling is unanimous in finding
that the need for signaling is greater in more un-
certain environments (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Ozmel
et al., 2013; Ramchander et al., 2012). However, not
all signals can be strengthened in the face of greater
uncertainty. For instance, some signals are impos-
sible to alter unilaterally, such as reputation, which
is both path-dependent (Lee, 2010; Pollock, Lee, Jin,
& Lashley, 2015) and relative (Huang &Washington,
2015). This weakens the accuracy of the signal in the
presence of greater information asymmetry. In our
context, wewould expect that inventions at different
stages of development, produced by different levels
of inventor experience, or with a wider range of ap-
plications may influence the licensee’s need for in-
formation about the invention. These conditions
create uncertainty for the licensee about the in-
vention’s potential commercial value.
We refer to the concept of signal strength (also
called signal fit), which is a central attribute of a sig-
nal: it is “the extent to which the signal is correlated
with unobservable quality” (Connelly et al., 2011:
53). To the extent that senders learn from experience
and improve their quality over time, we argue that
they will adapt their signal strength to their ability
and need to communicate with uninformed re-
ceivers. Increasing signal strength may be necessary
under certain conditions when an even stronger
signal is needed to overcome baseline doubts caused
by high information asymmetry.
Signal Characteristics
To ensure that an action is an unbiased and clear
signal, it is important to knowwhether it is sent with
an intentional purpose and for a specific receiver.
For example, the signaling value of a company’s
network is influenced by the fact that the company
originally pursued partnerships for a variety of
2 Anoften-cited example is thevalueof higher education
in the employment market. Employers—the uninformed
party—may find it hard to evaluate the quality of potential
workers. The workers, however, know their own ability
and can choose to invest time, effort, and resources in
pursuing higher education. Workers with higher ability
can achieve the same level of higher education but with
a lower investment of time, effort and resources than those
with a lower ability. The employer uses the education level
as a signal and offers wages that differ depending on the
higher education level of the worker. The equilibrium
separates if workerswith lower ability opt not to undertake
higher education because the higher wages do not suffi-
ciently compensate for their higher cost of achieving that
educational level.
3 To conserve space, we provide a much more compre-
hensive literature review of the signaling literature (based
on over 110 articles) involving these four characteristics in
Appendix A.
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reasons not linked to signaling (Reagans, Singh, &
Krishnan, 2015; Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012; Stuart,
2000). Similarly, studies on corporate announce-
ments report that these signals are broadcast to
multiple parties, rather than crafted to suit a unique
counterparty, limiting the sender’s ability to tailor
the signal to the recipient (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014;
Stern & James, 2015). However, in our setting in
which each contract is a unique negotiation outcome
between the TTO and the licensee firm, variations in
the contract terms can be made freely to reach a col-
laboration agreement tailored for the relationship. In
the TTO context, the contract structure variation is
an intentional signal sent to specific receivers. Since
misguided or misdirected signals can have costly
consequences, we investigate how varying ability
and need affects signaling effectiveness. Information
asymmetry and risk aversion among potential part-
ners create the need for a complex payment struc-
ture, but it requires the licensing managers’ ability
to skillfully design contractual agreements in ways
that signal enough value to actually bring parties
together.
In the following sections, we present a set of study
predictions and their supporting rationale. We offer
details about the mechanisms behind why licensing
manager experience leads to variations in upfront
fixed-fee payments and royalty rates. We also in-
vestigate sources of greater information asymmetry
(science-intensive inventions, inventor experience,
and wide patent scope) that represent contingencies
to this main relationship and situations for adjusting
signal strength. Given the lack of published research
on these mechanisms, we formulate our arguments
by deriving our own theoretical model and supple-
menting with insights from the broader signaling
literature.
STUDY HYPOTHESES
Value of Licensing Manager Experience
Before articulating our arguments for how experi-
enced licensing managers signal value through their
contract payment structure, we first establish
whether experience actually matters for higher li-
censing revenues from new technologies. This
would justify further investigation into howandwhy
experience matters for the contract payment struc-
ture itself. Consistent with research on managerial
ability and experience, we assume that skilled li-
censing managers accrue knowledge from past ef-
forts creating value in similar contexts (Holcomb
et al., 2009; Lepak et al., 2007). We examine if such
knowledge actually translates into commercial suc-
cess of the inventions they license.
One baseline argument for licensing experience is
that it improves one’s bargaining ability to negoti-
ate for higher licensing income. From a bargaining
perspective, we expect that licensing managers
with experience can gain insight into how to per-
suade parties to agree on performance-based con-
tract parameters (Ruckman & McCarthy, 2017).
The baseline expectation is that experienced li-
censing managers use the contract payment struc-
ture to bargain for as much as possible from their
licensees while minimizing their own risk. This
appears reasonable because experience provides
licensingmanagerswith a greater store of scenarios
to draw from, which can be used to negotiate more
confidently.
Besides the bargaining argument, there are other
reasons for the experience–performance relation-
ship. From research in entrepreneurship and other
related contexts involving nascent technologies, we
know that experience provides additional knowl-
edge that could translate into better performance. For
example, experienced entrepreneurs identify more
valuable economic opportunities by having a higher
threshold for performance (Chatterji, 2009). They
forecast with better accuracy (Cassar, 2014), raise
resources more quickly (Zhang, 2011), and heavily
depend on their experience to guide them in familiar
markets or technological domains (Eesley & Roberts,
2012). We tailor these insights into a specific ratio-
nale for the technology-licensing context. We argue
that experienced licensing managers generate value
through two mechanisms: improved selection of
promising inventions, and better matching with ca-
pable partners.
First, experienced licensing managers selectmore
promising new inventions for commercialization
(Hoppe & Ozdenoren, 2005; Macho-Stadler et al.,
2008). They are able to identify the best inventions
based on their earlier licensing agreements and on-
going interactions with current licensees. With this
knowledge, licensing managers can offer inventors
suggestions to improve their technology’s appeal to
potential licensees (Alexander & Martin, 2013;
Ruckman & McCarthy, 2017). This begins with ini-
tiating extensive pre-licensing dialogue with in-
ventors. Through these conversations, licensing
managers deepen their understanding of an in-
vention’s potential commercial applications, its
most receptive markets, technological limitations,
and what additional development may be required
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for successful commercialization. Experienced li-
censing managers may request more data from in-
ventors or ask them to run additional experiments,
knowing that this information will be critical for
attracting licensees.
Second, experience prepares licensing managers
to better match inventions with licensing firms and
more effectively persuade them to strike a bargain
(Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008). Li-
censing managers are responsible for marketing
inventions and searching for potential licensees.
Having negotiated past agreements widens a licens-
ingmanager’s network of potential licensees. Access
to this larger pool reduces search costs and ulti-
mately increases the odds of securing a good match
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005;Mortensen, 1988).When
past deals were constructed with performance-based
contracts, the ongoing business development reports
that licensee firms submitprovide licensingmanagers
with up-to-date industry information and market
conditions that affect the latest technology’s imple-
mentation. This deeper knowledge helps licensing
managers discern which markets and firms are most
likely to benefit from the invention, leading to
inventor–licensee collaborationswithhigher value-
creation potential (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, &
Scharfstein, 2006; Mindruta, 2013; Shane, 2000).
For these reasons, we predict:
Hypothesis 1. Licensing manager experience is posi-
tively related to the commercial success (licensing
revenue) of the licensed invention.
In the first prediction, we simply reasoned that
experience matters for commercial success without
specifying a particular pathway for this relationship.
We now contrast two pathways—better bargaining
skills, versus value creation through selection and
matching—by focusing on the two elements of the
contract payment structure itself. The impact of
better bargaining skills on the contract structure is
obvious: as the licensing manager gains experience,
they also gain a greater ability to negotiate for larger
upfront and royalty payments. By contrast, we pre-
dict from signaling theory a different outcome from
experience: that greater commercial success results
from trading lower upfront fixed-fees in return for
higher royalty rates. Moreover, themagnitude of this
tradeoff depends on the extent to which information
asymmetry clouds the assessment of an invention’s
commercial potential. In the following sections, we
provide our rationale for this alternative course. We
draw on the signaling literature to establish general
principles and then present arguments based on our
theoretical model for the mechanisms addressed in
our study.
Experience and Signaling Through
Contractual Payments
Under conventional bargaining principles, we
would expect risk-averse licensing managers to seek
to capture as large a share of commercial revenues as
possible and avoid scenarios that could jeopardize
guaranteed income, especially in the short-run. This
means that licensing managers would attempt to in-
crease their own fraction of the invention’s total
value without convincing the licensee of the greater
total value. This would lead us to see the most ex-
perienced licensing managers offering contracts that
are higher in upfront fixed-fee payments than those
negotiated by inexperienced managers. This type of
agreement minimizes the licensing managers’ down-
side risk, while still offering the upside of future
returns.
Formal theoretical work on signaling theory,
however, offers a different pathway for creating
agreements. We argue that licensing managers de-
ploy signals of value-potential through contractual
payment structures, by varying the two main com-
ponents of a typical licensing contract—upfront
fixed-fee payments and performance-based royalty
rates (Gallini & Wright, 1990; Macho-Stadler et al.,
2008). From signaling theory, we know that a pri-
vately informed signal-sender conveys higher qual-
ity by offering costly concessions—in our context,
this means presenting contract terms with a lower
upfront payment pairedwith higher royalty rates. By
doing so, licensing managers display their willing-
ness to bear the additional cost and risk of forgoing
guaranteed income in return for uncertain longer-
term gains (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Such a contrac-
tual design is based on the licensing manager’s con-
fident assessment that the resulting change in total
royalty revenue (the royalty ratemultiplied by value)
will ultimately compensate for the decreased up-
front payment (Gallini & Wright, 1990; Martimort,
Poudou, & Sand-Zantman, 2010). This type of
agreement structure offers a credible signal to risk-
averse licensees,whoareunlikely to give credence to
mere “cheap talk” or persuasion by the licensing
managers.
To date, neither the formal theoretical work nor
the empirical research published in the signaling
literature integrates experience as the basis for ac-
cruing superior knowledge. Thus, we develop our
own theoretical model to address this shortcoming
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(Appendix B provides full details).We argue that the
licensing managers’ level of experience determines
their overall expected revenue from royalties. While
the decreased upfront payment is valued identically,
regardless of experience level, an increased royalty
rate creates higher expected revenue for the experi-
enced licensing manager. Highly experienced li-
censing managers can exploit this difference to
credibly signal their expertise, and, by extension, the
value they create. Experience improves the cost-
benefit tradeoffs between the lower (but certain)
fixed-fee and higher (but uncertain) royalties.
If highly experienced licensing managers are
willing to give up some upfront payment, they can
offer a contract with a costly and credible signal and
obtain more value. The signal is costly because they
must forgo a guaranteed upfront payment, and
credible because the royalty rate is set such that a less
experienced licensing manager would not be suffi-
ciently compensated for the decrease in upfront
payment. As the experienced licensing manager
creates more value, however, the royalty rate in-
crease not only compensates for the upfront pay-
ment, but also generates additional revenue.
Therefore, thehighly experienced licensingmanager
prefers to offer a signaling contract.
Thus, under the signaling framework, the experi-
enced licensing manager signals a greater invention
value through ahigher royalty rate and lower upfront
payment, yieldinghigher total licensing revenue, but
limiting howmuch revenue can be obtained from the
licensee upfront. Rather than using their skills to
bargain for a larger share of the created value, highly
experienced licensingmanagers prefer to signal their
proficiency in selection andmatching to create high-
value collaborations. For these reasons, we predict:
Hypothesis 2. As licensing manager experience in-
creases, the upfront fixed-fee payment decreases
while the performance-based royalty rate increases.
Contingencies in the Experience–Signal–
Strength Relationship
Having established the primary relationship be-
tween experience and payment-structure outcomes,
we turn our theory development to three invention-
related contingencies that affect this primary re-
lationship: science-intensive inventions, inventions
produced by experienced inventors, and inventions
with broader patent scopes. Each of these charac-
teristics varies the amount of information asymme-
try that all parties must address when evaluating
potential agreements. As information asymmetry
and valuation uncertainty vary, so too will the need
to transmit a signal regarding quality and value-
creation potential. As in our main predictions, the
modulation of signal strength will be reflected in
tradeoffs between fixed and royalty payments.
Licensing managers use their experience to de-
termine signal strength that appropriately corre-
sponds to the need. When information asymmetry
increases, experienced licensing managers will
transmit a stronger signal by taking even less upfront
and shifting more of the payment to royalties, to
show their confidence in the invention’s value and
willingness to absorb more risk. By contrast, in the
absence of experience or when information asym-
metry is lower, the ability or need for a strong signal
is not ashigh, and licensingmanagerswill not shift as
extensively to royalty payments or sacrifice guaran-
teed upfront income.
We break new theoretical ground by examining
the interaction between experience (ability) and
changes in information asymmetry (need for signal-
ing) that results in adjusting signal strength (reduc-
tions in upfront fixed-fee payments and increases
in royalty rate). Recall that experience provides li-
censing managers with better insights into selecting
promising inventions to license and matching them
with capable licensees. Depending on the particular
need for signaling, licensing managers will draw
more heavily on their experience to use either one or
both of these skills. In the following sections, we
detail the rationale for each contingency and their
corresponding predictions.4
Adjusting Signal Strength: Science-Intensive
Inventions
When inventions are science-intensive, informa-
tion asymmetry regarding their value makes signals
harder to interpret (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007),
and uncertain financial returns make them difficult
to license (Hagiu & Yoffie, 2013). Therefore, sending
an even stronger signal becomes more important
when appealing to reluctant licensees amid higher
information asymmetry (Coff & Lee, 2003; Ozmel
et al., 2013; Ramchander et al., 2012). Accordingly,
4 For our moderating hypotheses, we expand the theo-
retical model introduced in Hypothesis 2 and use these
features to develop our rationale for Hypothesis 3–
Hypothesis 5. To conserve space, we omitted the graphs
and detailed numerical examples in the main text and
Appendix B.
1314 AugustAcademy of Management Journal
some scholars have predicted a stronger reliance on
royalty payments as a strategy for licensing science-
intensive inventions (Balmaceda, 2009; Fuller &
Blau, 2010). Our focus takes this one step further by
examining the interaction between change in the li-
censing environment (greater uncertainty due to in-
creased science intensity) andchange in abilityof the
signal sender (greater value creation through an ex-
perienced licensing manager) and their combined
impact on payment structures.
When selecting high-value opportunities, licens-
ing managers consider how far along inventions are
in their development. Mature inventions contain
a higher degree of applied science and have verified
results regarding their profitability. This makes it
easier for licensing managers to envision more
valuable opportunities based on well-defined in-
formation. With little uncertainty, experience does
not play asmuchof a role in determining the contract
structure, because the need for signaling is less im-
portant (Ozmel et al., 2013; Ramchander et al., 2012).
When licensing less-developed inventions, how-
ever, experience through selection and matching
becomes more relevant. Without deep connections
to existing technologies, these inventions are much
more “science-intensive” and linked to academic
research rather than commercial applications. With
commercial prospects less defined, licensing man-
agers must use their experience to envision valuable
opportunities that will not be initially apparent to
prospective licensees.As a result, the potential value
of these inventionswill vary,making itmoredifficult
to match to the best-suited licensee (Amram, 2005).
Larger variability increases the risk of royalty pay-
ments, making less experienced licensing managers
reluctant to reduce upfront payments (Sanders &
Boivie, 2004). However, experienced licensing
managers—who are more knowledgeable about the
underlying science—can more reliably select high-
value inventions, even if an invention is based on
less developed, more academic science (Shepherd &
DeTienne, 2005). In this case, finding the appropriate
partner who can commercialize an early-stage in-
vention is both more difficult and more crucial. Ex-
perienced licensing managers perform better
matching by knowing current industry trends and
keeping tabs on which firms are best equipped to
absorb and integrate new science into commercial
applications (Baron, 2006). This lowers the overall
risk of constructing collaborations that involve early-
stage inventions, making upfront payments less
necessary than they would be for less experienced
licensing managers. Taken together, the value that
amore experienced licensingmanager canprovide is
amplified in highly scientific inventions, and there-
fore the signal strength will be correspondingly am-
plified as well.
Hypothesis 3. For inventions heavily dependent on
academic science, the upfront fixed-fee payment de-
crease (Hypothesis 3a) and the royalty rate increase
(Hypothesis 3b) become more pronounced as licens-
ing manager experience increases.
Adjusting Signal Strength: Experienced Inventors
Inventors experienced in licensing are knowl-
edgeable about working with industry and their
commercialization capabilities. Knowing the needs
of potential industry partners, inventors can elect to
work on problems that are of particular interest to
them. Furthermore, past interactions give experi-
enced inventors a better awareness of the challenges
inherent in transferring academic science to a li-
censee (Zander & Kogut, 1995). Therefore, the
process of technology transfer will be more straight-
forward for experienced inventors and will lead to
producing academic science that is more valuable to
the licensee (Shane, 2000).
Licensing manager experience also provides ad-
ditional and complementary value to inventor ex-
perience. Because a licensing manager’s experience
is more market-related, their selection criteria will
not fully overlapwith the inventor’s criteria andwill
bemore selectivewith greater experience evenwhen
working with experienced inventors. Moreover, an
experienced licensing manager can better commu-
nicate with the inventors, allowing for a fuller un-
derstanding of the inventor’s own efforts at creating
value (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). This is especially
useful since experienced inventors generate more
inventions, but these discoveries come with higher
variability in their probability of being a break-
through (Conti, Gambardella, & Mariani, 2013). As
the inventions taken forward for licensing have passed
both the selection processes of the experienced in-
ventor and licensingmanager, they aremore valuable
and better aligned to external opportunities.
Because a licensee does not have a priori knowl-
edge about an inventor’s licensing experience, the
licensing manager needs to signal the value that is
created by the double selection from both the in-
ventor and their own experience. Thus, an experi-
enced licensing manager who represents an
invention from an experienced inventor is confident
in much larger value creation potential. This higher
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expected value increases the experienced licensing-
manager/inventor team’s ability to send a stronger
signal: a larger reduction in upfront payment, with
a larger increase in royalty rate.
The matching mechanism of licensing manager
experience is likely to be muted for experienced in-
ventors. Past research has found that licensing man-
agers rely on inventors to help generate leads within
their network (George, 2005; Jensen&Thursby, 2001).
These leads are likely to be particularly useful when
the licensing manager lacks experience. However,
they do not add significant value to the experienced
licensing manager, whose network is already quite
large without the inventor’s contribution. Therefore,
the matching mechanism decreases in importance as
licensingmanager experience increaseswhendealing
with inventions by experienced inventors.
When inventors are not as experienced, they lack
knowledge in evaluating commercialization oppor-
tunities andmay disclose inventions to the TTO that
are not appealing to industry (Shane, 2004). Al-
though licensing managers will be more selective as
they learn to patent and license (George, 2005;
Mowery, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2002), the upside
value is limited for inventions submitted by in-
experienced inventors because their discoveries are
inherently less valuable. As a result, experienced
licensing managers are less willing to send a strong
signal for inventions by inexperienced inventors. To
summarize, as licensing managers represent in-
ventions by experienced inventors, their ability to
send a signal through the payment structure in-
creases, because the value created from joint expe-
rience makes signaling less expensive. Experienced
managers will thus employ stronger signals to reflect
this greater value. For these reasons, we predict:
Hypothesis 4. For inventions by experienced inven-
tors, the upfront fixed-fee payment decrease (Hy-
pothesis 4a) and royalty rate increase (Hypothesis 4b)
become more pronounced as licensing manager ex-
perience increases.
Adjusting Signal Strength: Patent Scope
An invention with a narrow patent scope is easier
to match, regardless of the licensing manager’s ex-
perience. When an invention has a wide patent
scope, however, it has the potential to be applied in
many different industries and create greater value
(Lerner, 1994). To fully realize these additional op-
portunities, the licensing manager needs to match
the invention to the best licensee not only within
an industry, but also across industries. Therefore,
licensing manager experience is a stronger driver of
signalingwhen the patent scope iswide thanwhen it
is narrow; superior matching can create significant
value for a wide patent scope, but this is only possi-
ble for licensing managers with experience, due to
the difficulty of identifying the most promising li-
censee in the most attractive industry. While the
importance of experience onmatching is critical for
wide-patent-scope inventions, the impact from the
selection mechanism is less important: when in-
ventions have a wider patent scope, they have more
opportunities to be commercialized across many
different industries, so value can still be created if
a good match with a licensee is found (Lerner, 1994;
Merges & Nelson, 1990).
To signal greater value resulting from a wider
patent scope under information asymmetry, licens-
ing managers need to send a stronger signal to pro-
spective licensees. We know signal interpretation
varies among audiences (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014;
Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012): receivers react to signals
differently depending on their own information
(Soh, Mahmood, & Mitchell, 2004), and are more
likely to heed the signal if they conclude that the
signal or the signal sender will create value for them
(Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh, 2003; Marquis &
Qian, 2014). When evaluating inventions with
a wider patent scope, licensees are more likely to be
uncertain aboutwhether they are a suitablematch for
the invention, and will be more receptive to the li-
censing manager’s signal to overcome these doubts.
We argue that experienced licensing managers un-
derstand this, and will shift the contract payment
structure to offer contracts with more pronounced
increases in royalty rates and decreases in upfront
payments. For inventions with a narrow patent
scope, information asymmetry due to matching
concerns is lower and thus corresponds with a re-
duced need to signal, making them less dependent
on licensing manger experience.
To summarize, as licensing managers seek pro-
spective licensees for inventions with a wide patent
scope, they need to send a stronger signal in their
payment structure to overcome information asym-
metry in thematchingprocess. Experiencedmanagers
understand this need and employ their insights to
design stronger signals. For these reasons, we predict:
Hypothesis 5. For innovations with a wide patent
scope, the upfront fixed-fee payment decrease (Hy-
pothesis 5a) and the royalty rate increase (Hypothesis
5b) become more pronounced as licensing manager
experience increases.
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DATA AND METHODS
As described earlier, we tested our predictions
using original data from the TTO of a prominent
U.S. university. Similar to the MIT and Stanford
University TTOs, our setting has been the study
context for other published research,which includes
analysis of dynamic capabilities development using
licensing and patent data from 1927 to 2002 (George,
2005), inductive case studies on building legitimacy
for novel technologies and role-identity modifica-
tion among scientists who commercialize their in-
ventions (George & Bock, 2009; Jain & George, 2007;
Jain, George, &Maltarich, 2009), and the influence of
inventors’ scientific-domain distance on licensing
(Kotha, George, & Srikanth, 2013). However, our re-
search examinesnewaspects of this studycontext for
our main theory variables that have not been pre-
viously investigated or associated with published
results. We chose this context and these data spe-
cifically because they allowed us to examine con-
tracts between academia and industry partners to
commercialize inventions with uncertain value. A
technology-transfer license is a formal contract be-
tween the university and licensee that specifies the
conditions by which the licensee can use the in-
vention for commercial purposes. We analyze the
contract payment structure—the specific terms re-
garding the upfront fixed-fee andperformance-based
royalty rate paid by the licensee as the “price” for
using the technology.
Sample
Our sample consists of 964 invention-contract
pairs (527 contracts for patented and 437 contracts
for non-patented inventions) licensed from 1990 to
2002. Our sample also represents 427 inventions li-
censed through 472 contracts (314 single-invention
licenses and 158 bundled-invention licenses). In our
robustness analyses (discussed later), we ran addi-
tional models with the combined sample and for the
bundled contracts and found results consistent with
our main theory variable results.
Dependent Variables
Our study examined the following three de-
pendent variables: commercial success of the li-
censed invention (to test Hypothesis 1), and the
negotiated upfront fixed-feepayment and the royalty
rate between a TTO and a licensee firm (to test
Hypothesis 2–Hypothesis 5). The first dependent
variable—commercial success—is the licensing
revenue earned by the TTO from an invention. The
second and third dependent variables are based on
the payment structure. Licensing firms pay a fixed-
fee payment to theTTOupon licensing the invention
and royalties based on sales. Following standard
procedures to correct for skewness, we used the
natural log transformations of the dependent vari-
ables. For bundled contracts with multiple in-
ventions, we divided the payments according to the
contract allocation rules (most of them specified
equal sharing). In our sample, the average revenue
earned by an invention was $51,997 and the average
fixed-fee payment was $12,025. The royalty rate is
a percentage of annual sales based on the licensed
invention. The average royalty rate was 1.63% of
sales.
Independent Variables
Wecreated the licensingmanager experience (LME)
variable by counting the number of prior contracts
that were negotiated and signed by the focal licensing
manager at the time of invention licensing (Faems
et al., 2008; Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). To improve
its interpretation, we rescaled the variable by dividing
it by 10. We then formed three interaction variables
based on the cross-product of the licensing manager
experience (as a proxy for theability to signal) variable
with the following three explanatory variables (as
proxies for the need to signal). First, the science in-
tensity of an invention was based on the proportion
of the number of backward citations to academic-
scientific articles—outof the totalnumberofbackward
citations (academic articles plus other patents)—in the
invention’s patent. When the proportion is high, it in-
dicates that an invention is science-intensive, drawing
less heavily from the applied-scientific knowledge
associated with published patent domains. The in-
ventions with high academic-science content are also
early-stage technologies and difficult to transfer into
practice (Bikard, 2014). They require the inventors’
ongoing involvement before they can be realized into
actual products or services, or the knowledge effec-
tively transferred to licensee firms. Conversely, at
lower proportions of academic-scientific to total
backward citations, the inventions are likely to be at
a later stage in the commercialization cycle. These
inventionswill require less ongoing involvement from
inventors and less effort by licensing managers to
match them to prospective licensees (Ziedonis, 2007).
Second, inventor experience is measured by the
average number of prior disclosed inventions among
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inventors. Third, patent scope was created based on
“the number of sub-classes into which the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) assigns
the patent” (Lerner, 1994: 320).
Control Variables
We accounted for several characteristics of the
licensing manager, the inventor, the invention, and
the licensee as control variables.
Licensing manager control variables. We con-
trolled for the number of unlicensed inventions in
a licensingmanager’s portfolio over the previous five
years, as a large inventory of unlicensed inventions
may pressure them to settle for less-than-favorable
agreements. We also created variables to represent
positive performance and negative performance
relative to their own past performance and to other
licensing managers. According to behavioral theory,
licensing managers who perform relatively better
now than in the past and relative to others may
have different motivations behind their licensing
terms than less successful managers. We used two
spline variables to represent positive and negative
licensing-manager performance (following Greve,
2003). We also included licensing-manager fixed
effects to account for any other idiosyncratic, time-
invariant unobserved factors that may be related to
our dependent variables. During the sample period
from1990 to 2002, therewere 11 licensingmanagers,
each of whom specialized in a different scientific
domain. As such, it was unnecessary to include ad-
ditional domain fixed-effect variables.
Inventor control variables. In addition to in-
ventor experience, we controlled for other charac-
teristics of the invention team, which included the
presence of star scientists on the team—an indicator
variable (15yes) if at least oneof the inventors on the
project achieved this distinction—as determined
based on their citations and research record5; the
number of inventors, as larger teamsmay createmore
valuable inventions (Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007)
and may serve as an independent signal; and
prior collaboration—the proportion of inventors
who had worked together prior to the current
invention—because these inventor teamshave lower
coordination costs (Kotha et al., 2013).
Invention control variables. We controlled for
invention quality by counting the number of cita-
tions the technology’s patent received until 2007
(excluding self-citations). This decision was based
on Ziedonis (2007), who demonstrated that citation
counts serve as a useful indicator of an invention’s
economicpotential.We included an indicator variable
to denote whether the invention resulted from funded
research (1 5 a private firm or government agency
funded the research), as fundedprojects are likely tobe
of greater commercial interest to a sponsoring firm.We
incorporated count variables for the number of times
an invention has been previously licensed (and pre-
viously licensed2 to account for diminishing returns)
and the number of inventions in a bundled contract.
Inventor teamscanworkondenovoprojects;however,
it is more common for inventors to work on path-
dependent technology trajectories (Dosi, 1982). In-
ventorswhoworkwithin a given technology trajectory
often have a rich history that propels them forward,
whereas de novo projects present more risk. When
an invention is disclosed to the TTO, the Intellectual
Property-rights Manager (IPM) systematically asks
whether the project is de novo or a continuation of an
existing stream of research. We used an indicator var-
iable to capture whether the project was a continuing
invention (15 yes).
Licensee control variables. In addition to our
inventor and invention controls, we also controlled
for several aspects of the licensee firms. For the
licensee-expertise variable, we used the number of
patents owned by the licensee on the agreement
signing date. To verify the robustness of this mea-
sure, we examined the actual contract documents
and correspondence between the licensee and the
TTO. If the contract documents or development
plans mentioned the licensee’s expertise, we coded
the variable as 1. Using this measure, we tested the
mean difference in the number of patents and found
that licensees with expertise owned 3.78 patents,
whereas licensees without expertise owned 0.68.
This differencewas significant (pvalue,0.001), and
we found similar results using either measure. Li-
censees with ongoing relationships become recog-
nized partners, unlike one-time participants in an
arm’s length transaction (Corts & Singh, 2004;
Granovetter, 1985). To determine the licensee-
manager relationship history, we counted the num-
ber of inventions the focal licensing manager had
licensed to the firm prior to the current invention. To
capture licensee size, we used an indicator variable
5 To determine star-scientist status, we adapted Zucker
and Darby’s (1996) citation-based identification method
and rationale.We reliedondata from ISI’s list of the top250
scientists in 21 subject categories (www.isihighlycited.
com).Wemanuallymatched this list to each inventor from
our licensing data. Out of the 4,950 unique inventors in our
sample, we identified 135 inventors as star scientists.
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to capture the publicly listed company status (1 5
yes) of the firm at the time of contract signing.6 As
most cutting-edge knowledge is not publicized and
the inventors are often located near their university
TTO licensors, we also controlled for the licensee-
TTO distance (in miles between the university and
the licensee firm’s headquarters). For licensee firms
with multiple locations, we checked the contract
documents to identify the location where the in-
vention’s commercial development took place.
Estimation Strategy
To test Hypothesis 1, we used an ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation to predict the commercial
success of an invention. To test Hypotheses 2–5, we
used seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to jointly
predict the royalty rate and fixed payment amount in
a contract simultaneously, as they could be related
(Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004;
Wooldridge, 2002; Zellner, 1962). One advantage of
using SUR estimations is that this technique prop-
erly accounts for correlated error terms in a set of
equations such as ours, where the determination of
fixed-fee payments and royalty rates occurs jointly.
Furthermore, not all of the inventions in the TTO’s
portfolio are licensed, and there may be unobserved
factors that may cause an invention to be licensed,
influence contract payment structures, and be cor-
related with licensing manager’s experience. To ac-
count for these conditions,we implemented a simple
sample selection correction (Hamilton & Nickerson,
2003) and use the sample selection hazard in all
estimations of contract payment structures as an
additional control variable.
RESULTS
We report our summary statistics and correlations
in Table 1 for the sample of inventions disclosed to
the TTO. All correlations that equal 0.064 and above
are significant at a p value , 0.05.
In our controlModel 1 (Table 2),we report theOLS
regression estimation results predicting the com-
mercial success of an invention. In Model 2, we in-
troduce licensing manager experience (LME) to test
the Hypothesis 1 that, ceteris paribus, LME will be
positively related to the income earned by an in-
vention. We find support for Hypothesis 1 (Model 2;
b 5 0.09; p 5 0.052) in the full sample and similar
results in thepatented sample (Model 3;b50.10;p5
0.119). As LME increases from one standard de-
viation (SD) below the mean value to one SD above,
the income earned by an invention increases by
207% (from $1,796 to $3,711). This confirms our
prediction that LME experience matters for commer-
cial success.Weproceed to our next set of hypotheses
to analyze more specifically how experience matters
for constructing contract payment structures.
In Table 3, we report the SUR estimations to pre-
dict the fixed-fee payments and royalty rates for
the patented sample. InModel 1, we present only the
controls and LME variables. Before we discuss the
tests of the hypotheses, it is worth highlighting a few
results concerning the control variables to explore to
what extent conventional bargaining explanations
apply to our predictions.
For ease of exposition, we focus on contrasting
bargaining and signaling explanations for several
control variables that are significant predictors of
both fixed-fee payments and royalty rates. First, we
examine licensee size. From a bargaining perspec-
tive, a larger licensee, who has more power, would
pay lower fixed-fees and royalty rates. From a sig-
naling perspective, there would be less need to send
a signal to a well-resourced licensee that could pre-
sumably use its resources to conduct a thorough
analysis of the invention being proposed. Thus, sig-
naling theory also predicts that as licensee size in-
creases, the licensee canmore effectively discern the
potential value created by the licensing manager.
Therefore, the licensing manager does not have to
send as strong a signal and can design a contract
structure with a higher fixed-fee payment (b5 1.20;
p , 0.001) and lower royalty rate (b 5 20.27; p ,
0.001). These results for licensee size are consistent
with the signaling explanation. Second, we review
the results for geographic distance. A bargaining
perspective would suggest that it would be easier to
bargain over short distances, so we would expect
both royalty rates and the upfront payment to de-
crease with greater distance. A signaling perspective
would suggest that matching is more difficult with
distance; thus, less value is created, and the licensing
manager offers a correspondingly weaker signal
(higher upfront payment b 5 0.36; p , 0.001; lower
royalty rate b 5 20.03; p 5 0.02) for geographically
distant licensees. This is what we in fact observe.
Third, from the signaling theory perspective, we ar-
gue there will be greater information asymmetry as-
sociatedwith science-intensive inventions, inventor
experience, and inventions with wide potential
6 For a subset of our sample, we also measured licensee
size based on the number of employees of the company;
this yielded similar results for the theory variables.
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patent classes. Therefore, these inventions should be
associated with stronger signals. Results support the
predictions of the signaling theory.
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted the direct main ef-
fect of LME on the two contract terms: a negative
relationship with the amount of fixed-fee upfront
payment and a positive relationship with the size of
the royalty rate. The results are consistent with our
predictions (shown in Model 1). LME is negatively
related to upfront payments (b 5 20.17; p 5 0.04;
note that the fixed-fee payment variable has been
transformed as a natural log). As LME increases from
1 SD below the mean value to 1 SD above, the fixed
amount decreases by 17% (from 7.91 to 6.55; see
Figure 1a). On the other hand, the negotiated royalty
rate increaseswith LME (b5 0.02;p5 0.04). As LME
increases to 1 SD above the mean, the royalty rate
increases from 1.62% of sales to 1.97%, an increase
of 22% (see Figure 1b).
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that as inventions
become more science intensive, the direct relation-
ship between LME and the two contract termswould
magnify, showing larger decreases in upfront fixed-
fee payments (Hypothesis 3a) and larger increases in
royalty rates (Hypothesis 3b). We observe results
consistent with these predictions (shown inModel 2
and plotted in Figures 2a and 2b). For science-
intensive inventions, the original direct and negative
LME-fixed-fee relationship intensifies (b 5 20.32;
p 5 0.02). As LME increases from mean –1 SD to
mean11, the upfront fixed-fee payment for science-
intensive inventions decreases from 7.88 to 6.15
(22%).However, for lowscience-intensive inventions,
the upfront fixed-fee payment increases from 8.04 to
8.25 for the same change in LME. In regards to royalty
rates for science-intensive inventions, the original di-
rect and positive LME-royalty rate relationship in-
tensifies (b5 0.05; p5 0.005). As LME increases from
mean –1 SD to mean 11, the royalty payments for
science-intensive inventions increase from 1.65% to
2.12, an increase of over 28%. However, for low
science-intensive inventions, the royalty rate de-
creases from1.54%to1.44—adecreaseof6%—for the
samechangeinLME.Hypothesis3 isalsosupported in
the full model with all the interactions (see Model 5).
In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that as LME in-
creases, the direct relationship between LMEand the
two contract terms would magnify for inventions by
experienced inventors, with the upfront fixed-fee
payment decreasing (Hypothesis 4a), and the royalty
rate increasing (Hypothesis 4b) at more noticeable
levels. We find results consistent with these pre-
dictions when we examine the betas of the in-
teractions (Model 3 andplotted inFigures 3a and3b).
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Commercial success (ln) 7.86 3.70 1
Fixed payment (ln) 6.42 3.71 .34 1
Royalty rate (ln) 0.62 0.71 –.16 –.16 1
Not patented 0.45 0.50 –.12 –.22 .05 1
Science intensity 0.42 0.38 .09 .21 .06 –.53 1
Inventor experience 1.85 1.05 –.02 .09 .06 –.15 –.01 1
Patent scope 0.65 0.53 .11 .24 .07 –.57 .68 .14 1
Unlicensed inventions 28.00 23.99 –.10 .10 .04 .02 .04 .13 .05
Positive performance 0.04 0.08 –.20 –.11 .19 .04 –.04 .01 –.04
Negative performance 20.01 0.02 –.11 –.11 .07 .05 .05 .07 .03
Star scientist 0.22 0.41 .04 .11 –.07 –.29 .40 .28 .31
Number of inventors 3.09 2.26 –.01 –.09 .10 .16 –.09 .17 –.16
Prior collaboration 0.50 0.45 –.05 –.10 –.06 –.08 .01 .49 .06
Invention quality 13.63 21.15 .10 .13 –.22 –.58 .21 .09 .23
Funded research 0.62 0.49 –.14 –.13 .12 .20 –.15 –.10 –.20
Previously licensed 6.73 7.52 –.01 –.10 –.45 .11 –.13 –.12 –.26
Number of inventions 5.01 5.13 –.05 –.02 –.01 –.20 .11 .57 .21
Continuing invention 0.53 0.50 .05 .26 .03 –.29 .34 .11 .46
Licensee expertise 2.83 2.94 .30 .37 –.33 –.15 .11 .11 .16
Licensee–manager relationship 0.18 0.38 –.12 –.20 .03 .10 –.06 .03 –.15
Licensee size 0.30 0.46 .22 .22 –.25 –.03 .05 .01 .00
Licensee–TTO dist. (‘000km) 1.45 1.88 .13 .24 –.16 –.03 .04 –.01 –.03
Licensing manager experience 46.63 40.07 –.05 .03 .07 –.01 .08 .35 .09
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For inventions by experienced inventors, the origi-
nal direct and negative LME-fixed-fee relationship
strengthens (b520.09; p5 0.02). As LME increases
from mean –1 SD to mean 11, the upfront fixed-fee
payment for inventions by experienced inventors
decreases from 8.07 to 5.13, a decrease of 36%.
However, for inventions by inventors without expe-
rience, the fixed upfront payment decreases from
8.10 to 7.69—a decrease of 5%—for the same change
inLME.The original direct andpositive LME-royalty
rate relationship similarly strengthens (b5 0.01; p5
0.01). As LME increases, the royalty payment for
inventions by experienced inventors increases
from 1.93% to 2.97. For inventions by inventors
without experience, the royalty payment increases
from 1.38% to 1.45 for the same change in LME.
Due to multi-collinearity in the full model, only the
fixed-payment coefficient is statistically significant
(p 5 0.03).
In Hypothesis 5, we predicted that for widely ap-
plicable inventions (wide patent scope), the direct
relationship between LME and the two contract
terms would magnify, displaying more pronounced
decreases in upfront fixed-fee payments (Hypothesis
5a) and increases in royalty rates (Hypothesis 5b).We
find results fully consistent with these predictions
(shown in Model 4 and Figures 4a and 4b). We
observe a negative and significant effect for the in-
teraction term on fixed upfront payments (Hypoth-
esis 5a: b520.18; p5 0.07). As LME increases from
mean –1 SD to mean 11, the upfront fixed-fee pay-
ment for widely applicable inventions decreases
from 7.70 to 5.93—a decrease of 23%. For more
narrowly defined inventions (mean –1 SD), the
upfront fixed-fee payment decreases from 8.12 to
7.30—a decrease of only 10%—for the same change
in LME. In addition, for widely applicable in-
ventions, the original direct and positive LME-
royalty rate relationship intensifies (b 5 0.08; p 5
0.000). As LME increases from mean –1 SD to mean
11, the royalty payments for widely applicable in-
ventions increase from 1.52% to 2.20, an increase of
nearly 45%. Formore narrow inventions, the royalty
rate marginally decreases from 1.73% to 1.67 for the
same change in LME. Due tomulti-collinearity in the
full model, only the royalty-rate coefficient is statis-
tically significant (p , 0.001).
Robustness Checks
We conducted a series of robustness checks to
verify our findings. In the first set of analyses, we
TABLE 1
(Continued)




.08 –.08 .02 1
–.02 .32 –.02 –.05 1
.05 .04 .08 .28 .12 1
–.05 –.08 –.13 .29 –.13 .14 1
.06 –.06 .13 –.26 –.07 –.03 –.29 1
.00 –.16 .00 .11 .06 .07 .13 .04 1
.12 .01 .10 .44 .03 .39 .14 –.16 –.10 1
–.01 –.01 .04 .11 –.16 .10 .20 –.16 –.20 .09 1
.01 –.09 –.11 .05 –.06 –.01 .17 –.17 .00 .11 .15 1
.10 –.02 .06 .01 .02 .06 –.04 .07 .08 –.05 –.17 –.03 1
.04 –.02 .00 –.02 –.06 –.04 .08 –.06 .09 .09 .03 .54 –.04 1
.04 –.18 –.19 .10 –.04 –.08 .06 –.08 .21 –.12 –.05 .15 .01 .12 1
.65 –.29 .07 .33 .01 .24 –.03 .01 –.04 .39 –.06 –.10 .16 –.07 .05
Note: n 5 964 observations; all values of 0.064 and above are significant at p , 0.05.
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employ new decision variables to validate the se-
lection and matching mechanism for the interaction
hypotheses. Second, we examined signaling theory
predictions in the full sample of inventions consist-
ing of patented and non-patented inventions. Third,
we confirmed that the signaling theory predictions
also hold at the contract level. Fourth, we examined
what type of licensing manager experience is most
important in determining contract terms. Fifth, we
contrasted the experience of licensing managers,
inventors, and licensees to see whose experience
best explains the choice of contract terms.
Additional analyses to validate selection and
matching mechanisms. We conducted further ana-
lyses to validate our selection and matching mech-
anisms as the drivers for experience. To accomplish
this, we formed two new dependent variables (DVs),
one to test for selection and the other to test for
matching, to use in the post-hoc analysis. We reran
our analyses using these DVs. If we observed statis-
tically significant results for our theory variables
with these DVs, we inferred that the selection and
matchingmechanismswere operating as expected in
our predictions (summarized in Table 4).
To test the selection mechanism: we constructed
a new variable identifying inventions selected for
commercialization. In our view, this variable offers
a direct test about whether licensing managers
assigned to an invention become more selective
(i.e., less likely to select an invention for commer-
cialization) as their experience increases. Our pre-
diction for this post-hoc analysis is that as LME
increases, the likelihood that a given invention will
be accepted for commercialization will decrease as
a result of being more selective about which in-
ventions they attempt to commercialize. We formed
a sample of 1,967 inventions disclosed to the TTO in
the sample window and used it to test if LME is
negatively related to selection probability. This
dependent variable is binary (1 5 TTO selected
invention for initial commercialization efforts,
otherwise 0). Once an invention is disclosed to
the TTO, an intellectual property manager and a li-
censing manager are assigned to the invention.
TABLE 2
OLS Estimations of Commercial Success of an Invention
Full Sample Patented Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Science intensity 20.49 (0.53) 20.55 (0.52) 21.39** (0.67)
Inventor experience 20.08 (0.19) 20.06 (0.19) 0.19 (0.24)
Patent scope 0.50 (0.34) 0.52 (0.34) 20.10 (0.41)
Unlicensed inventions 20.01** (0.01) 20.02*** (0.01) 20.03** (0.01)
Positive performance 212.68*** (2.49) 212.16*** (2.44) 219.32*** (3.55)
Negative performance 4.31 (7.82) 4.95 (7.86) 1.82 (11.62)
Star scientist 0.44 (0.36) 0.36 (0.36) 0.13 (0.47)
Number of inventors 0.16*** (0.05) 0.16*** (0.05) 0.27*** (0.07)
Prior collaboration 20.20 (0.32) 20.22 (0.32) 20.10 (0.36)
Invention quality 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Funded research 20.80*** (0.29) 20.80*** (0.29) 20.77** (0.31)
Previously licensed 21.89** (0.84) 21.88** (0.84) 20.12 (1.61)
Previously licensed squared 0.34 (0.22) 0.34 (0.22) 20.03(0.45)
Number of inventions 20.17 (0.27) 20.20 (0.27) 20.75** (0.35)
Continuing invention 0.22 (0.29) 0.29 (0.30) 0.33 (0.32)
Licensee expertise 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Licensee–Manager relationship 20.41* (0.23) 20.45** (0.23) 0.25 (0.45)
Licensee size 0.82*** (0.25) 0.81*** (0.26) 0.87*** (0.31)
Licensee–TTO distance (’000km) 0.03 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 0.06 (0.09)
LME (H1) 0.09* (0.05) 0.10† (0.07)
Constant 11.26*** (1.11) 10.90*** (1.13) 10.64*** (1.64)
R2 0.29 0.29 .31
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Licensing-manager and year fixed-effects are included but not reported to conserve space.




***p , 0.01 (two-tailed test)
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Approximately once a month, the TTO’s manage-
ment team evaluates which inventions to commer-
cialize by filing patents and evaluating licensing
opportunities. These are the first steps in the com-
mercialization process. We used this DV as a test of
themechanism of Hypothesis 2 and of Hypothesis 4.
Both tests yielded results supporting a selection
mechanism: experienced licensing managers select
fewer inventions for commercialization (b5 20.84;
p, 0.001) but limit their selectivitywhen it comes to
inventions by experienced inventors (b 5 0.07; p ,
0.001). Unfortunately, we could not use this DV as
a test forHypothesis 3 (science-intensive inventions)
and Hypothesis 5 (patent scope) because the in-
ventions that are not selected for commercialization
are also not patented, which is a feature we required
to test for the selection mechanism related to these
two predictions (the two moderators depend on
having patent information for the inventions).
To test the matching mechanism: we constructed
another variable identifying exclusive licensing of an
invention. This second variable was also binary (15
exclusively licensed). If an invention is licensed
exclusively, the TTO is exposed to the risk of the
licensees shelving the technology as a competitive
tactic (Dechenaux, Thursby, & Thursby, 2009). Un-
less the licensingmanager is assured of the licensee’s
market intentions and can trust their actions, the li-
censingmanager is less likely to agree to an exclusive
license. As LME increases, we expect that their ex-
perience enables them to match inventions with the
best licensee who will use its exclusive agreement
productively and will make substantial investments
to commercialize, rather than shelve, the invention.
Less experienced managers are not as confident in
their matching abilities and would be less likely
to sign an exclusive agreement. We found results
for a direct relationship (as a test of Hypothesis 2),
as the probability of signing an exclusive agree-
ment increases with LME (b5 0.02; p 5 0.02). The
probability of signing an exclusive agreement in-
creases even more for science-intensive inventions
TABLE 3
SUR Estimations with Licensing Manager Fixed Effects of Fixed Payment (ln) and Royalty Rate (ln)
(1) (2)
Fixed Royalty Fixed Royalty
Sample selection hazard 5.12** (2.09) 20.57* (0.30) 5.05** (2.08) 20.56* (0.29)
Science intensity 21.30** (0.60) 0.27*** (0.08) 21.36** (0.50) 0.28*** (0.08)
Inventor experience 20.25 (0.34) 0.13*** (0.05) 20.30 (0.33) 0.14*** (0.05)
Patent scope 21.56*** (0.49) 0.20*** (0.07) 21.56*** (0.49) 0.20*** (0.07)
Unlicensed inventions 20.02 (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 20.01 (0.01) 0.00** (0.00)
Positive performance 5.86* (3.01) 1.61*** (0.42) 6.19** (3.00) 1.56*** (0.42)
Negative performance 227.82*** (9.22) 21.68 (1.30) 231.59*** (9.31) 21.05 (1.31)
Star scientist 1.74** (0.68) 20.03 (0.10) 1.66** (0.68) 20.02 (0.09)
Number of inventors 0.40*** (0.12) 20.09*** (0.02) 0.39*** (0.12) 20.09*** (0.02)
Prior collaboration 20.24 (0.40) 20.13** (0.06) 20.21 (0.40) 20.13** (0.06)
Invention quality 20.01 (0.01) 20.00 (0.00) 20.01 (0.01) 20.00 (0.00)
Funded research 0.02 (0.30) 20.03 (0.04) 0.11 (0.30) 20.05 (0.04)
Previously licensed 1.19 (1.20) 21.41*** (0.17) 1.44 (1.19) 21.45*** (0.17)
Previously licensed squared 20.29 (0.33) 0.24*** (0.05) 20.37 (0.33) 0.25*** (0.05)
Number of inventions 20.95*** (0.31) 20.02 (0.04) 20.75** (0.32) 20.05 (0.05)
Continuing invention 1.66** (0.71) 20.08 (0.10) 1.62** (0.71) 20.07 (0.10)
Licensee expertise 0.00* (0.00) 20.00 (0.00) 0.00* (0.00) 20.00 (0.00)
Licensee–Manager relationship 20.62** (0.27) 0.06 (0.04) 20.57** (0.27) 0.05 (0.04)
Licensee size 1.20*** (0.33) 20.27*** (0.05) 1.18*** (0.33) 20.27*** (0.05)
Licensee–TTO distance (‘000km) 0.36*** (0.08) 20.03** (0.01) 0.33*** (0.08) 20.02** (0.01)
Licensing Manager Experience (LME) (H2) –0.17** (0.08) 0.02** (0.01) 0.04 (0.12) 20.01 (0.02)
LME3 Science intensity (Hypothesis 3) –0.32** (0.14) 0.05*** (0.02)
LME3 Inventor experience (Hypothesis 4)
LME3 Patent scope (Hypothesis 5)
Constant 2.19 (3.54) 2.83*** (0.50) 1.09 (3.55) 3.02*** (0.50)
Pseudo
R2 0.24 0.59 0.24 0.60
x2 147.10 690.39 154.26 709.78
Log likelihood 21409.26 21403.50
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(b 5 0.04; p 5 0.01) and inventions with a broad
patent scope (b 5 0.06; p , 0.001), indicating the
greater impact of improved matching. We use this
as evidence in support of the matching mechanism
at work for these predictions. Consistent with our
prediction, the post-hoc test for the matching mech-
anism was not significant for inventor experience
(b 5 0.01; p 5 0.26).
We also ran our original models (DV 5 contract
payment structure components) once more with
another independent variable to further explore the
matching mechanism. When an invention is li-
censed to licensees with whom they have a prior
relationship, the licensing manager’s ability to ef-
fectively match the invention to the appropriate
licensee is enhanced.We counted the prior licensing
contracts between the licensee and either the in-
ventor or the licensing manager. Prior relationship
ratio is the proportion of prior relationships between
the licensee and licensing manager out of all prior
licensing contracts involving either party. In this
situation, the licensee’s scientific and technical ca-
pabilities are well known to the licensing manager.
Consequently, for a given level of experience, li-
censing managers will secure a better match for a li-
censee with whom they have a prior relationship
than they would otherwise. More value is thus cre-
ated in repeat licensing relationships, and the li-
censing manager sends a stronger signal. Consistent




Fixed Royalty Fixed Royalty Fixed Royalty
6.45*** (2.16) 20.77** (0.30) 4.84** (2.09) 20.45 (0.29) 6.20*** (2.17) 20.56* (0.30)
21.36** (0.59) 0.28*** (0.08) 21.15* (0.60) 0.20** (0.08) 20.04 (0.81) 0.07 (0.11)
0.05 (0.36) 0.09* (0.05) 20.21 (0.33) 0.12*** (0.05) 0.00 (0.36) 0.10** (0.05)
21.36*** (0.50) 0.17** (0.07) 20.52 (0.76) 20.25** (0.10) 20.92 (0.77) 20.21** (0.11)
20.03* (0.02) 0.01*** (0.00) 20.01 (0.01) 0.00** (0.00) 20.02 (0.02) 0.00** (0.00)
6.55** (3.01) 1.51*** (0.42) 6.24** (3.01) 1.45*** (0.41) 7.00** (3.00) 1.38*** (0.41)
231.19*** (9.29) 21.18 (1.31) 230.77*** (9.34) 20.40 (1.28) 235.94*** (9.42) 0.12 (1.29)
2.24*** (0.71) 20.11 (0.10) 1.72** (0.68) 20.02 (0.09) 2.14*** (0.71) 20.06 (0.10)
0.46*** (0.13) 20.10*** (0.02) 0.39*** (0.12) 20.09*** (0.02) 0.44*** (0.13) 20.09*** (0.02)
20.38 (0.41) 20.10* (0.06) 20.11 (0.41) 20.18*** (0.06) 20.29 (0.41) 20.17*** (0.06)
20.01 (0.01) 20.00 (0.00) 20.01 (0.01) 20.00 (0.00) 20.01 (0.01) 20.00 (0.00)
20.02 (0.30) 20.03 (0.04) 0.11 (0.31) 20.07 (0.04) 0.10 (0.31) 20.07 (0.04)
1.62 (1.20) 21.47*** (0.17) 1.22 (1.19) 21.42*** (0.16) 1.86 (1.20) 21.48*** (0.17)
20.40 (0.33) 0.25*** (0.05) 20.32 (0.33) 0.25*** (0.05) 20.49 (0.33) 0.27*** (0.05)
20.89*** (0.31) 20.03 (0.04) 20.94*** (0.31) 20.03 (0.04) 20.69** (0.32) 20.05 (0.04)
2.11*** (0.73) 20.15 (0.10) 1.44** (0.72) 0.02 (0.10) 1.95*** (0.75) 20.02 (0.10)
0.00* (0.00) 20.00 (0.00) 0.00* (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
20.60** (0.27) 0.06 (0.04) 20.60** (0.27) 0.06 (0.04) 20.55** (0.27) 0.05 (0.04)
1.25*** (0.33) 20.28*** (0.05) 1.23*** (0.33) 20.28*** (0.04) 1.25*** (0.32) 20.28*** (0.04)
0.39*** (0.08) 20.03*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.08) 20.02** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.08) 20.02** (0.01)
20.00 (0.11) 20.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.13) 20.05*** (0.02) 0.27* (0.16) 20.08*** (0.02)
20.31** (0.14) 0.04* (0.02)
–0.09** (0.04) 0.01** (0.01) 20.09** (0.04) 0.01‡ (0.01)
–0.18* (0.10) 0.08*** (0.01) 20.08 (0.11) 0.07*** (0.01)
20.97 (3.78) 3.31*** (0.53) 1.37 (3.56) 3.20*** (0.49) 22.25 (3.79) 3.52*** (0.52)
0.24 0.60 0.24 0.62 0.25 0.62
154.02 705.18 151.33 770.59 162.68 782.93
21404.40 21392.99 21387.14
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All estimations include sample selection hazard to control for unobserved effects leading to licensing
and contract structure. Licensing-manager fixed effects are included but not reported to conserve space. n5 527 (patented sample).
‡ p 5 0.198
* p , 0.10
** p , 0.05
*** p , 0.01 (two-tailed test)
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FIGURES 1–4
Interaction Plots of Experience and Payment Structure
























































































































































Pat. Scope= Low Pat. Scope= Low Pat. Scope= HighPat. Scope= High
Inv. Exp.= High Inv. Exp.= Low Inv. Exp.= High
Sci. Int.= High Sci. Int.= Low Sci. Int.= High
A B
Notes: These plots are based on results from Table 3 (Model 1: Hypothesis 2, Model 2: Hypothesis 3, Model 3: Hypothesis 4, Model 4:
Hypothesis 5). X-axis values range from –1 SD to mean to 11 SD. Y-axis values are fixed payment (ln) and royalty rate (ln), respectively.
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relationships increase, reduced upfront fixed-fee
payments (see Table 5; b 5 20.32; p 5 0.02) and
increased royalty-rates (see Table 5; b 5 0.05; p 5
0.02) occur at an increasing rate.
Full sample. Similar to the licensed-invention
portfolios of other TTOs, our sample contained
a mixture of patented (55% of the total) and unpa-
tented inventions. As mentioned earlier, our main
analyses focused only on the patented and licensed
inventions, as these provided us with additional in-
formation about invention quality and a variety of
other economically relevant characteristics (Shane,
2002). But in this robustness check, we re-ran our
models on the combined sample of inventions. We
included an additional control variable to indicate
whether an invention was unpatented and set the
patent based control in the unpatented sample to
zero. In this sample, using the same variables as in
the full sample, we found results similar to our main
results based only on the patented inventions (see
Table 5).
Results at the contract level. Our main analyses
were at the individual-invention level to examine the
signaling-need mechanism at the most detailed
level. Since some inventions were licensed together
as bundles, we re-ran our models at the bundled-
contract level. To ensure robustness at this level, in
the patented sample we constructed aggregate vari-
ables by using the median values of the invention’s
science intensity, inventor experience, patent scope,
and prior relationship ratio within an agreement.
(These variables for single-invention contracts
retained their original values.) We found consistent
results for licensing manager experience, inventor
experience, patent scope, and prior relationships
variables.
Licensing experience or failure experience. It is
possible that licensingmanagersmay also learn from
TABLE 4

















Supported Present (more selective
with experience) (b 5
0.84; p , 0.001)
Present (more confident of
matching so more likely
to sign exclusive license)
(b 5 0.02; p5 0.02)
Support for H1 (higher
licensing income) also
confirms that LM
experience leads to value




Supported Can’t be tested since non-
commercialized
inventions are also not
patented
Present (LME with higher
experience are more
likely to science heavy
inventions to exclusive
licensee)
(b 5 0.04; p5 0.01)
Hypothesis 4: Inventor
experience3 LME
Supported Present (as LME and
inventor experience both
increase) (b 5 0.07; p ,
0.001)
Not present as posited by
us (LME and inventor
experience are not
complements for
matching proxy) (b 5
0.01; p 5 0.26)
We argued for only the
selection mechanism for





Supported Can’t be tested since non-
commercialized
inventions are also not
patented
Present (LM with higher
experience are more
likely to take inventions
with wide applicability
to exclusive licensee
(b 5 0.06; p, 0.001)
We argued for only the
matchingmechanism for
this hypothesis and find
evidence consistent with
our arguments.
Notes: By “present,” we mean that our post-hoc analyses revealed evidence in support of the arguments for selection or matching in our
predictions.
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unsuccessful attempts at licensing (Zheng, Miner, &
George, 2013).Whilewe do not have comprehensive
data on unsuccessful attempts at licensing, we do
have information on all the inventions in the li-
censing managers’ portfolios. To the extent that li-
censing managers attempted to license and were
unsuccessful, the unlicensed inventions in their
portfolios could also influence their learning. While
we control for this stock of unlicensed inventions in
the licensing managers’ portfolios in all our estima-
tions and robustness analyses, here we attempt to
explore if the licensing managers also learned from
the unlicensed inventions in their portfolios.We did
not find any support that this form of learning better
equipped licensing managers to signal in line with
our predictions. Prior work with unlicensed in-
ventions does not appear to improve the selection of
potential technologies, or matching them to prom-
ising licensees as reflected by the signals we have
defined.
Whose experience: Inventor’s, licensing man-
ager’s, or the organization’s? To the extent that
licensing managers rely on inventors, inventor ex-
perience may be more important than licensing
manager experience for signaling. Therefore, we re-
peat the estimations in Table 3,Models 2–5, by using
inventor experience in place of LME.We do not find
similar results to our main findings. Similarly, we
replaced LMEwith the TTO organization’s licensing
experience in a domain. In these models, we find
weak but statistically significant results for our the-
ory variables. Both of these robustness tests confirm
that LME with actual licensing is most strongly as-
sociated with signaling.
In summary, our robustness checks supported our
hypotheses and predicted that licensing managers
improve their ability to signal as they gain experi-
ence. In addition,we also took steps to confirm that it
is the licensing managers’ experience and not the
inventor or the organization’s experience that ismost
important for signaling. Furthermore, the extension
to signaling theory that we have developed in this
paper is a robust framework in our context and can
explain many contingencies in the selection of a li-
censing deal structure.
DISCUSSION
Our study investigated the relationship between
LMEand the contract payment structure for a sample
of over 950 licensing contracts from a TTO at a large
U.S. university. To summarize our key findings:
LME is positively associated with the commercial
success of licenses (Hypothesis 1), and as LME in-
creases, upfront fixed-fee payments decrease while
royalty rates increase (Hypothesis 2), showing evi-
dence of how LME use the contract payment struc-
ture to signal value to licensees. Furthermore, we
find three contingencies that accentuate the positive
LME-signaling relationship and lead to stronger sig-
nals: inventions heavily dependent on academic
science (Hypothesis 3), greater inventor experience
(Hypothesis 4), and wider patent scope (Hypothesis
5). The selection and matching mechanisms of LME
argued for each contingency were generally vali-
dated through additional analyses. We discuss the
implications of these findings in this section.
Implications for Signaling Theory Research
Our study offers several theoretical advancements
to the signaling theory literature.We investigate how
sellers can use contract payment structures to signal
value to prospective buyers. We demonstrate the
importance of evaluating signals in terms of a unified
framework combining the seller’s ability to signal
value through the contract payment structure to
buyers who need a signal to overcome doubts cau-
sed by information asymmetry. We establish how
ability influences signal strength and its adjustability
depending on the need for it. Given our emphasis on
experience throughout the study, we also display
how signaling ability can be a learned skill focused
on identifying valuable opportunities and convey-
ing these possibilities to prospective buyers. In the
following section, we elaborate on each of these
implications.
Signaling through the contract payment struc-
ture. The contract payment structure—the combina-
tion of upfront fixed and performance-based royalty
payments—can be viewed as a form of pricing in-
tellectual property. Pricing as a signal has actually re-
ceived relatively little attention in the management
literature, despite being at the heart of most signaling
models in the economics literature. (See Appendix A
for the literature reviewdetailing the limited research.)
We studied a setting where the predictions of eco-
nomic theory could be verified by studying pricing
decisions of the licensingmanagers. Our central claim
has been that intermediaries (the licensing mangers in
our context) signal value to skeptical buyers by trading
guaranteed upfront payment for deferred royalties.
Intermediaries are only willing to propose such ar-
rangements if they determine that the value generated
from the royalties of the intellectual property will
exceed the forgone upfront payments. Otherwise,
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standard bargaining principles are more effective: us-
ing the contract structure to settle clashing interests
by capturing as much return as possible in guaranteed
and royalty payments. Our analysis confirmed our
central claim about signaling through contract pay-
ment structures and the importance of sender and
recipient characteristics for signal strength.
Our work offers additional insights regarding how
signals operate for those affiliated with highly ca-
pable or high-status partners. From the prior re-
search, we know that well-connected entrepreneurs
and start-ups are more likely to receive investments
from venture capitalists (Hsu, 2007; Shane & Cable,
2002), and those with strong and reputable partners
are more likely to have higher valuations (Stuart,
Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).When a licensingmanager’s
experience is taken into account, we observe that the
contracts are structured to signal the potential value
of working with highly experienced inventors
through a combination of an even lower fixed-fee
and higher royalty rates (see Table 3, Model 1). From
these results, we argue that even in situations that
involve highly capable inventors, the licensing
manager’s experience still offers opportunities to
employ signals to convey potential value, in contrast
to a more common bargaining explanation.
Credible and effective signals depend on both
ability and need. We advance signaling theory by
our emphasis on the ability and need to signal,
which allows us to comment on the nature of a good
signal: one based on the sender’s ability that fulfills
the need to address information asymmetry. First,
the signal purposefully links the sender’s ability to
his or her profits, allowing the sender to vary the
signal strength intentionally and specifically to
their intended receivers. This is not trivial, as a large
portion of the signaling literature has studied sig-
nals that are unintended by-products of a signal
sender’s actions, such as getting an education or
embedding a firm in a network. Education is not
undertaken with the primary aim of signaling, and
thus is a noisymeasure of ability (Sauer et al., 2010).
Similarly, networks formed by young firms are
path-dependent and choice-constrained (Stuart,
2000), and are thus a noisy measure of future firm
profitability. In our context, the signal is closely
aligned with the signal sender’s ability. This in-
creases the signal’s accuracy and eases the re-
cipient’s interpretation.
Second, a good signal fulfills a need, namely to
communicate an uncertain value to the signal re-
cipient.Many signals studied in the literature cannot
be targeted uniquely at one recipient, and the signal
sender may then face complicated trade-offs, as
different audiences interpret signals differently
(Gomulya & Boeker, 2014). We are fortunate that our
context uses a signal that is specific to each licensee,
as the contract terms are uniquely established in
each negotiation.
Up to now, the empirical findings of signaling
theory on contract structure have been mixed, with
some research finding support for signaling (Macho-
Stadler et al., 2008; Shane et al., 2006), while others
do not (Hegde, 2014; Lafontaine, 1993). To help
tackle the inconsistent empirical results of the the-
oretical signaling models, we developed a compre-
hensive framework that expanded the scope of
inquiry to cover the sender’s entire signaling envi-
ronment to improve assessments of signal strength
(Connelly et al., 2011). We derived our own theo-
retical model that looks at the characteristics of the
sender and the environment to predict signaling
ability and need, and thus ultimately the strength
and fit of the signal. Signaling ability and need are
a joint prerequisite for sending a signal, yet the lit-
erature does not question how or why they arise
(assuming that both are present and mostly fixed).
We argue that the inconsistent results could be re-
solved, in part, by better integration of these two
features.
Adjusting signal strength based on ability and
need. We developed predictions on some of the
contingencies thatwere speculatedbyConnelly et al.
(2011) to change the strength of, and the need for,
a signal. Examining these contingencies (our mod-
erators) allowed us to demonstrate why predictions
of signaling theory may be difficult to confirm in
prior work that did not consider changes in the sig-
naling environment (Heil & Robertson, 1991; John &
Williams, 1985; Ndofor & Levitas, 2004). Depend-
ing on the contingencies, the relationship between
licensing-manager-experience and contract-payment-
structure outcomes either strengthened or weakened
with changes in the need to signal. Our results provide
new empirical support that confirms how signals ad-
dress information asymmetry obstacles that normally
lead to unproductive negotiations. Thus, we expand
our understanding of how signals operate in environ-
ments where the signal sender’s ability and need to
signal vary. This stands in contrast to the static envi-
ronment typically assumed in this literature.
Moving from innate signaling ability to gained
experience. Up to now, signaling research has as-
sumed a sender’s innate ability to make a fairly accu-
rate assessment of their environment and to signal
accordingly (e.g., signaling through education—Morris,
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Alvarez, Barney, & Molloy, 2016; Trevor, 2001).
Similarly, a firm who wants to convey informa-
tion about its organizational, environmental, prod-
uct or process quality (e.g., Jayasinghe, 2016;
King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005; Montiel, Husted, &
Christmann, 2012; Ramchander et al., 2012) is nat-
urally expected to know whether they excel in that
dimension or not before attempting to signal. Our
work revisited the fundamental assumptions about
whether and how the signal sender acquires supe-
rior information to communicate to the receiver.
We argued that experienced licensing managers
can better discern an invention’s market value by
exercising their skill in selecting the most prom-
ising inventions and matching them with capable
licensing partners for commercialization. This si-
multaneously increases the quality of the invention
and lowers the information asymmetry presented to
risk-averse licensees.
Implications for Academic Entrepreneurship
Research
In the academic entrepreneurship literature, re-
searchers investigate how academic inventions are
commercialized amid the uncertainties inherent in
emergent technologies. In one research stream,
scholars focus on how the experience and knowl-
edge gained from past endeavors contribute to eval-
uating and pursuing new business opportunities
based on their inventions (Gruber, MacMillan, &
Thompson, 2008; Shane, 2000). In another research
stream, the emphasis has been on how intellectual
property rights (Thursby & Thursby, 2003) or the
design of contract structures (Jensen & Thursby,
2001) influence commercial outcomes. Our research
bridges both streams by its focus on a specific type of
experience—the ability of licensing managers to se-
lect promising inventions, to match them with capa-
ble licensing firms, and to construct a credible signal
using the contract payment structure to bring parties
together in an agreement. By linking the opportunity-
evaluationand licensing-contract-design streams,our
study yields deeper insights into how and why some
inventions advance to commercialization in ways
that prior research from either stream has not.
At the heart of entrepreneurship is the pursuit of
value-creating opportunities and themobilization of
sufficient resources to successfully undertake them
despite uncertain conditions (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006;
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Stevenson & Jarillo,
1990). In our context, we highlight how licensing
manager experience improves the selection of
promising opportunities (from the pool of new in-
ventions disclosed to the TTO) and the matching of
these opportunities to the commercialization part-
ners best prepared to generate a financial return.
Despite the lack of complete information about
a technology’s efficacy and a partner’s capabilities,
experienced licensing managers gain the skills to
construct contract terms that generate greater value
for all parties involved. As the licensingmanagers in
our context gain experience, they become better at
identifying quality inventions and matching them
with the appropriate licensee—increasing value
while reducing the risks of commercialization. To
accomplish this, they signal a willingness to give up
a sure upfront payment in exchange for higher, but
uncertain, returns. Experience also brings licensing
managers a greater appreciation of possible contin-
gencies, such as differences in the maturity of the
technology, and the expertise and relationship his-
tory of the licensing partner. This deeper awareness
allows them to adjust contract terms based on
changes in uncertainty due to lower information
asymmetry. Generalized more broadly, our study
opens up new conceptual pathways for un-
derstanding how specific domain experience leads
to improvements in opportunity selection and
matching these opportunities with the appropriate
resources—such as recruiting co-founders, engaging
with supply-chain partners, or forming alliances—
despite the uncertainties caused by incomplete in-
formation (Gre´goire & Shepherd, 2012). Such skills
lead to the development of contingent agreement
structures that bind parties together through shared
value creation. The empirical evidence indicates
that repeat and portfolio entrepreneurs are more
likely to identify better opportunities (Baron &
Ensley, 2006) to structure deals differently (Hsu,
2004) and to achieve better outcomes (Stuart &
Abetti, 1990). Our work expands this knowledge
base about how experience translates into pursuing
value-creating opportunities through academic–




Our study also broadens our understanding of how
collaborative agreements between organizational
actors are created, and highlights the vital role that
intermediaries (the TTOs in our context) play in this
process. In contrast to brokers who simply bring to-
gether parties in a short-term transactional manner,
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intermediaries succeed by creating new value that
incorporates the interests of all parties (Ashenfelter&
Dahl, 2012). To accomplish this, intermediaries
embed themselves into the agreements and only
benefit if the performance of the collaboration suc-
ceeds in the long run (March & Olsen, 1989). Rather
than employ conventional bargaining tactics to se-
cure the largest returns only for themselves, our re-
search demonstrates how collaborative agreements
can actually produce benefits for all parties. Al-
though the conceptual arguments for this alternative
viewpoint have already been published, our study
demonstrates and tests the mechanisms by which
intermediaries form such agreements inways that no
prior field research has shown.
We report how integrative agreements are designed
by experienced intermediaries who are “givers” to
their collaborative partners (giving up sure upfront
payments for an increased share of risky performance
payments which all parties benefit from) rather than
simply intermediaries who are “takers” (demanding
higher fixed and performance payment) from negoti-
ations (Grant, 2013). In our context, the early-stage
status of these inventions makes information asym-
metry a significant obstacle to overcome in order
for a fruitful collaboration to occur. The prospects
of reaching a stalemate remain high, but in our
framework, experienced intermediaries can forge
agreements by signaling potential value-creation op-
portunities through contract terms. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is the first to apply signaling
principles to explain how and why experienced in-
termediaries determine the ideal contract structures
for demonstrating the value of early-stage inventions.
Our insight into the construction of integrative
agreements also advances new thinking about the
specific attributes of how these agreements come
together. Ours is one of the first field studies to show
how a licensingmanager’s experience influences the
construction of collaborative agreements. Although
prior experimental studies have established the im-
portance of understanding the role of experience in
mediation (Bazerman & Neale, 1985; Bazerman,
Neale, Valley, Zajac, & Kim, 1992), our findings ac-
tually pinpoint its influence, both in terms of the
direct relationship on commercial success as well as
the contingent influences of the inventor and in-
vention’s characteristics.
Managerial Implications
Our study insights have immediate applications
for practitioners who need to bring together parties
who are separated by information asymmetry and
risk aversion. One of the biggest obstacles in forging
effective licensing deals is the inability for partners
to come to an agreement. The attitudes of optimistic
inventors and the risk-averse preferences of the li-
censing partners can easily lead to market failure:
both parties disagree about their relative and total
contributions to value creation, especially when
there are significant technological uncertainties
(Dushnitsky, 2010). Our research provides practi-
tioners a framework for resolving this stalemate. The
licensing managers in our context were guided by
their experience, which allows them to be more se-
lective about the best inventions to bring to market,
and the best firms with which to collaborate. Experi-
enced managers signal this additional value through
contract structures. Similar to ways in which man-
agers benefit by issue-framing in contract develop-
ment (Neale&Bazerman, 1985;Weber&Mayer, 2011,
2014; Weber, Mayer, & Macher, 2011), experienced
intermediaries can apply their insights from prior
contracts to signal, match, and shift contract terms in
ways that motivate parties to come together and ex-
pend the effort required to achieve the best outcomes.
Thus, one direct implication is that organizations in-
volved in technology licensing should cultivate
practices for inexperienced licensing managers to
learn from theirmore-experienced counterparts. This
can occur through direct mentoring or pairing senior
and junior licensing managers together to conduct
deals to increase the rate of learning and knowledge
sharing (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991; Toft-Kehler,
Wennberg, & Kim, 2014). Given the counterintuitive
nature of credible signals, direct and repeated expe-
rience offers licensing managers opportunities to im-
prove their abilities to constructwinning agreements.
Having more opportunities to select inventions,
match them with firms, and send credible signals in
the contract payment structure also allows licensing
managers to realize that no two contracts need to look
alike. Experience permits them to adjust their signals
to the corresponding circumstances and respond to
varying levels of uncertainty caused by information
asymmetry.
To appreciate the scope of these implications, it is
helpful to understand the size and growth prospects
for our context. According to recent statistics, firms
are licensing technologies from universities at an
increasing rate, with more than 5,000 licenses (with
year-over-year growth of 4.7%) and a total licensing
university income of $2.6 billion (with year-over-
year growth of 6.8%) in 2012 as reported by the
Association of University Technology Managers
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(AUTM, 2015). When intra-firm licensing is added,
patent revenue in the U.S. reached $45 billion in
2013 (BEA, 2014).
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Although we exercised care in designing our
study, it is not without limitations. We briefly de-
scribe how future research may yield additional in-
sights beyond those we have offered here. There are
two avenues to improve our theory to predict con-
tract payment structure design. First, while we iso-
lated both the selection and matching mechanisms
in the post-hoc analysis, futurework should build on
our findings to verify the relative magnitude of these
mechanisms. Second, new research should seek to
determine the initial reference points of parties who
enter into a negotiation and assess how these refer-
ence points influence contract structure. This in-
cludes investigating licensing manager experience
in terms of differences between contract experience
and prior interactions with multiple inventors more
carefully. Future studies should investigate other
contexts in which collaborative agreements are
constructed to build upon our study’s findings.
While our research site offers a host of advantages to
observe and isolate inventions and licensing capa-
bilities that may not be as evident in other contexts,
we speculate that in most large organizations that
license technology, the theoretical principles from
our framework will generally apply. Future work
should assemble licensing data from multiple TTOs
aswell as non-academic corporate licensors to better
understand the increasing economic importance of
licensing-in and licensing-out inventions.Moreover,
the conceptual framework employed in our study can
also be applied to other settings where intermedi-
aries assist buyers and sellers who do not easily
agree on quality and value, such as artistic and
cultural products, and professional athletics.
CONCLUSION
Every year, billions of dollars are invested in basic
science. However, many promising inventions are
overlooked because of the difficulties associated
with assessing commercial opportunities. In situa-
tions that involve technological uncertainties and
require collaboration between multiple parties,
experience plays a vital role in producing value-
sharing agreements. Our study shows how expe-
rienced licensing managers create value-sharing
arrangements in ways that benefit society through
the commercialization of breakthrough science. Ex-
perienced intermediaries maximize the value pro-
duced from an uncertain undertaking by improving
the selection of promising projects and matching
them with capable partners to form a fruitful collab-
oration. We advance signaling theory by developing
a comprehensive framework that integrates the abil-
ity and needs of the signaler, and the intentionality
and specificity of the signal. By signaling high po-
tential value outcomes through a combination of
upfront fixed-fee and delayed royalty rates, the ex-
perienced licensing managers in our context engen-
der confidence in otherwise reluctant parties and
pave the way toward value-generating outcomes.
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APPENDIX A
In Appendix A, we present a summary table classifying
thesignaling literature in themanagement fieldaccording to
the type of signal used and the properties of the signal along
four dimensions: whether the signal can be modified with
changing ability and need of the signal sender and whether
the signal is intentional or not as well as whether it is spe-
cific to the signal recipient or broadcast for multiple re-
cipients. These dimensions were chosen because a signal
that scores highly on all these dimensions is more likely to
bea trueandunbiased signal, as it is reactive to the signaling
environment and uniquely crafted for the focal interaction.
By and large, the literature exploring signaling has
assumedthat there is aconstant abilityand limitedvariability
in the need to signal, and then exploredwhat types of signals
are being sent; what makes signals more or less effective; or
how multiple signals interact. The table reveals very few
studies that extensively address all four dimensions. As
a result, we still lack a comprehensive understanding about
untangling the underlying reasons to send out signals or not.
By studyingbilateral contractswritten by a signal sender
with time-varying ability, we have a setting that displays
all four desirable dimensions of a signal. It is also a setting
that enables us to study the antecedents of the signaling
decision. We base our arguments on the literature when-
ever we refer to the interactions between the dimensions
that have already been studied in the literature, anduse our
theoretical model to establish the framework when con-
sidering all four dimensions simultaneously.
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TABLE A1
Signaling Literature Overview
Context Ability Need Intentional Specific Comments
Bilateral contracts Y Y Y Y Bilateral contracts specifying a trade-off between payment
types can be crafted to send a signal exclusively tailored to
the exchange partner. Payment terms are a particularly
strong signal as they have an immediate impact on the
revenue of the signal sender that is largely independent of
external factors. However, very little research has been
published integrating all four aspects.
Education Y Y Education is generally assumed not to affect ability (Spence,
1973). Individuals have limited flexibility to tailor the
costly signal to different needs (Merluzzi & Phillips, 2016;
Sauer et al., 2010). The revenue impact of the signal is
moderated by labor market characteristics (Merluzzi &
Phillips, 2016; Trevor, 2001).
Certification Y Y Sometimes Certification serves more than one purpose (Hsu & Ziedonis,
2013) and the outcome is observed by all stakeholders. The
signal sendermay have somediscretion about certification
options to pursue (Jayasinghe, 2016; Montiel et al., 2012;
Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012). The signal’s value can be
affected by external factors such as corruption (Montiel
et al., 2012) or the signaling behavior of competitors
(Ramchander et al., 2012).
Announcement Sometimes Y Y Announcements are broadcast to multiple receivers (Stern &
James, 2015).While announcements can be flexibly tailored
to the need (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003) and sometimes the
ability (Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012), they risk being
perceived as lacking in substance (Gomulya & Mishina,
2017). The impact of the signal depends on the sender’s
perception of the receivers (Gomulya&Mishina, 2017; Stern
& James, 2015).
Network Y Networks serve more than one purpose, e.g., financing
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006) or knowledge sharing (Reagans
et al., 2015; Stuart, 2000; Reuer & Koza, 2000; Soh et al.,
2004). The signaling function of the network is frequently
incidental in nature. Hence, Kilduff et al. (2016) warn
against seeing a signal where there may be none, and
show that returns are not always forthcoming. The variety
of purposes of network formation also means that the
value of the signal varies with the exchange partner
(Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012).
Reputation Y Reputation and status are path-dependent and evolve with
the actor’s ability (Pollock et al., 2015; Lee, 2010). This
limits the sender’s ability to manipulate it as a signal.
Reputation is a relative construct as it exists in
comparison to other actors (Lee, 2010; Huang &
Washington, 2015). Thus the benefits from reputation as
a signal can be greatly affected by the environment
(Kova´cs & Sharkey, 2014).
Pricing Y Y Sometimes Sometimes Extensive theoretical work shows that pricing structure can be
used for signaling (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Bagwell &
Riordan, 1991). Kirmani andRao (2000) claim that empirical
evidence of price as a signal of quality is equivocal. Etzion
and Pe’er (2014) argue that the mixed empirical results are
due to theuseof cross-sectional data rather than longitudinal
data, as the environment and the sender change.
Notes: This summary table is based on a review of over 110 articles on signaling from four management journals (ASQ, AMJ, Org Sci, SMJ)
from 2000 to 2016.




licenses an invention that can takeon twovalues,VL andVH ,
depending on thequality of thematchbetween the invention
and the licensee. The licensing manager finds a good (poor)
match with probability q (12q). The expected value of the
invention isW 5 qVH 1 ð12 qÞVL. After contracting, the li-
censing manager receives a share 12f2½0; 1 of the ex-
pected valueW (the remaining f go to the licensee).7
The contract contains two different terms: an upfront
payment F and a royalty rate r that is calculated on the
value of the invention. Note that in the absence of infor-
mation asymmetry, when a risk-averse licensing manager
signs with a risk-neutral licensee,8 the optimal contract
contains an upfront payment only.
As the licensing manager gains experience, she chooses
more valuable inventions to propose to the licensee—
i.e., VL and VH increase—and is more likely to achieve
better matches—i.e., q increases. The licensing manager’s
experience, however, is private information and not ob-
servable to the licensee.
For simplicity’s sake, assume that there are only two levels
of licensing manager experience (LME): no experience (sub-
script NE) or a fixed level of experience (subscript E).9 We
have VE,H $VNE,H , VE,L$VNE,L and qE $ qNE . This means
thatWE $WNE . The values for VH , VL, and q are known to
the licensee, but the licensee does not know the LME.
For a given no-experience contract ðFNE , rNEÞ, the ex-
perienced licensing manager can signal her experience

























































The first constraint is the licensing manager’s incentive
compatibility constraint, i.e., the inexperienced licensing
manager receives a higher utility from choosing the contract
that corresponds to her type than by choosing the contract
that is designed by the experienced licensing manager. This
ensures a separating equilibriumwith the truthful revelation
of theLME.Thesecondconstraint is the licensee’s individual
rationality constraint, and it ensures that she earns at least
a fraction f of the total value created.
The inexperienced licensing manager does not signal,
andoptimallychooses rpNE 5 0 andF
p
NE 5 ð12fÞðqNEVNE,H 1
ð12qNEÞVNE,LÞ.Wesubstitute into the experienced licensing








































Both constraints set an upper limit on FE for a given rE ;
thus, only one holds with equality, and the other one is
redundant. We use the binding constraint to substitute FE
out and optimize over rE only.We prove that the royalty rate
will be non-zero for the experienced licensing manager.
Define a new variable ~x5x2FE and the function
~Uð~xÞ5UðxÞ2UðFEÞ. This functionisconcave in ~x.Thenwe
can rewrite the optimization problem as follows (assuming
the first constraint is binding, and the second is redundant—

































































We take the first order derivative of the objective over rE at
rE 50 and find that it is positive, thus indicating that the
experienced licensingmanager shouldoptimally set anon-




















































Thuswe find that themain effect of LMEcauses an increase
in the royalty rate (rpE . r
p




7 This representation of the bargaining game is typical of
the Nash bargaining equilibrium model. The relative bar-
gaining power of both partieswill affect the share that each
party receives.
8 Or at least with a licensee who is less risk-averse than
the licensing manager.
9 The results can be extended to an arbitrary number of
experience levels or even to continuous experience levels.
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Numerical Examples
Hypothesis 3. Science-Intensive Inventions
Base case without experience shows higher variability in values and lower matching probability. We argue that for
science-intensive inventions, the selection and matching mechanisms of experienced licensing managers are more




uðxÞ5 ﬃﬃﬃxp Licensing manager’s utility function
f5 80% Nash bargaining parameter
V0,L5 1;V1,H 5 2;q050:5 Values for licensing manager without experience
V1,L5 1:05;V2,H 5 2:05;q15 0:6 Values for licensing manager with low experience
V2,L5 1:1;V2,H 52:1; q25 0:7 Values for licensing manager with high experience
TABLE B2
Hypothesis 2. Licensing Manager Experience









0 r1 r2 Royalty rate
Extra value
Low Experience, High Fixed Payment
High Experience, High Fixed Payment
Low Experience, Low Fixed Payment




V0,L5 0:5;V1,H 52:5; q05 0:4 Values for licensing manager without experience
V1,L5 0:6;V2,H 52:6; q15 0:5 Values for licensing manager with low experience
V2,L5 0:7;V2,H 52:7; q25 0:6 Values for licensing manager with high experience
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Compared to the base case (Hypothesis 2), the upfront payment decreases and the royalty rate increases at a greater ratewhen
inventions are science-intensive.
Hypothesis 4. Inventor Experience
Base case without experience shows higher variability in values and identical matching probability. We argue that for
inventors with experience, the selection mechanism is more impactful and leads to a higher value improvement, whereas the
matching mechanism is unaffected.
Compared to the base case (Hypothesis 2), the upfront payment decreases and the royalty rate increases at a greater ratewhen
the inventor has experience.
Hypothesis 5. Patent Scope
Base case without experience shows identical value improvement andmatching probability. We argue that inventions with
a wide patent scope aremore difficult to match and reduce the impact of licensingmanager experience, whereas the impact of
experience on the selection mechanism is unaffected.
TABLE B4
Contract Terms







V0,L5 0:5;V1,H 52:5; q05 0:5 Values for licensing manager without experience
V1,L5 0:6;V2,H 52:6; q15 0:6 Values for licensing manager with low experience
V2,L5 0:7;V2,H 52:7; q25 0:7 Values for licensing manager with high experience
TABLE B6
Contract Terms







V0,L5 1;V1,H 5 2;q050:5 Values for licensing manager without experience
V1,L5 1:05;V2,H 5 2:05;q15 0:55 Values for licensing manager with low experience
V2,L5 1:1;V2,H 52:1; q25 0:6 Values for licensing manager with high experience
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Compared to the base case (Hypothesis 2), the upfront payment decreases and the royalty rate increases at a greater ratewhen
the invention has a wider patent scope.
TABLE B8
Contract Terms
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